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This thesis deals with accusations against individuals and groups historically known as 
the Kızılbaş in Ottoman Anatolia in the sixteenth century, in particular those accusations 
which were made against the Kızılbaş by the Ottoman state. This thesis is interested in 
the relationship between the Ottoman state and its own subjects. It does not aim to explore 
the political struggles between the Ottomans and the Safavids, nor does it go into a 
religious analysis. This examination proposes a broad categorization for the accusations 
which were made against the Kızılbaş based on the type, content, and similarities of 
accusations. The examples studied here either reflect the religious sensitivities of the state 
or its political interests. The types, content, and similarities of accusations are asserted 
according to whether they breached the principles of Sunni Islam, public morality, or 
political interest. The present examination questions whether it is possible to categorize 
them and whether it is possible to attribute a “religious” or “political” quality to them in 
a clear-cut way. The introduction positions this study within Ottoman Sunni 
confessionalization and empire-building processes in the sixteenth century world. The 
second chapter examines how the Kızılbaş were defined by political and religious 
authorities. The third chapter explores the Ottoman criminal process. The fourth chapter 
categorizes the offences that were made against the Kızılbaş and examines each category 
in detail with multiple examples. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
OSMANLI HUKUKUNDA BİR PRATİK: ON ALTINCI YÜZYILDA 
KIZILBAŞLARA KARŞI YAPILAN SUÇLAMALAR 
 
 
 
FEYZANUR CEYLAN 
 
TARİH YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, EKİM 2019 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç.Dr. Ayşe Ozil 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kızılbaş, Osmanlı Hukuku, Ceza Hukuku 
 
 
Bu tez 16. yüzyıl Osmanlı Anadolu’sunda tarihsel olarak Kızılbaş diye bilinen kişi ya da 
gruplara isnad edilen suçları konu edinmektedir. Osmanlı devleti tarafından Kızılbaşlara 
karşı yapılan suçlamalar bu tezin merkezindedir. Bu tez Osmanlı devletinin kendi 
tebaasıyla arasında olan ilişkiyle ilgilenmektedir. Bu çalışmanın hedefi Osmanlı ve Safavi 
devleti arasındaki politik mücadeleyi incelemek ya da dini bir analiz yapmak değildir. Bu 
çalışma türlerine, içeriklerine ve benzerliklerine dayanarak Kızılbaşlara karşı yapılan 
suçalamalar için geniş bir kategorizasyon önermektedir. Burada çalışılan örnekler ya 
devletin dini hassasiyetlerini ya da siyasi çıkarlarını yansıtmaktadır. Suçlamaların tür, 
içerik ve benzerlikleri Sünni İslamın temel prensiplerini, toplumsal ahlakı veya siyasi 
çıkardan hangisini ya da hangilerini ihlal ettiklerine göre belirlendi.  Bu değerlendirme 
bir kategorilendirmenin mümkün olup olmadığını ve suçları kesin bir biçimde “siyasi” ve 
“dini” suçlar olarak ayırmanın olası olup olmadığını sorgulamaktadır. Giriş bölümü bu 
çalışmayı 16. yüzyılda Osmanlı devletinin bir imparatorluk haline gelmesi ve Sünnileşme 
sürecinin içinde konumlandırmaktadır. İkinci bölüm Kızılbaş kavramının siyasi ve dini 
otoritelerce nasıl tanımlandığını incelemektedir. Üçüncü bölüm Osmanlı’daki cezai 
süreci incelemektedir. Dördüncü bölüm Kızılbaşlara isnat edilen suçları 
kategorilendirmekte ve her kategoriyi birden çok örnekle detaylı bir biçimde 
incelemektedir.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In the sixteenth century among the Mediterranean empires, there was a tendency towards 
state-enforced religious orthodoxy and politico-religious integration. These policies have 
been termed confessionalization and this age is often called the age of 
confessionalization. Scholars have asserted that Europe experienced confessionalization 
between the mid-fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries (Farr 2003, 276-293; De Boer 
2003, 294-307; Craciun, Ghitta, and Murdock 2002). For the Ottoman Empire, scholars 
have recently advocated for a confessionalization period based on the parallels between 
the two regions. They have defined Ottoman confessionalization as the transformation of 
Ottoman religious perception and understanding according to the interplay between 
imperial politics and confession-building in the early modern period (Terzioğlu 2013, 
304; Krstić 2011, 12-16).1 
 
Other religio-political waves that influenced the empires at this time were millenarian and 
the idea of an impending apocalypse, as well as messianic ideas. The Ottomans, Safavids, 
and Hapsburgs also made claims of universal monarchy in the sixteenth century and 
employed messianic expectations and understandings of millenarianism to rally people 
behind these claims and to enforce and consolidate their power. They established their 
imperial claims in messianic terms (Krstić 2009, 39-40). 
 
 
 
 
1 Some scholars such as March Baer argue against the claim that the Ottoman Empire experienced confesionalism in 
the way that Europe did. 
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The universalistic imperial ideology and messianic claims in the sixteenth century as well 
as religious confessionalization, influenced the state building process in the Ottoman 
Empire. The Ottoman state employed these notions and claims in its state-building and 
presented itself as the defender of Sunni Islam and a world empire and enforced 
confessionalization to support these claims vis-à-vis the similar claims of the Safavid and 
Hapsburg empires (Atçıl 2017, 49-59; Şahin 2013, 1-12; Krstić 2009, 39-40). 
 
Regarding the claim of leadership of the Muslim world and the competition to become 
the ruler of the Middle East, the Safavids on the borders of the Ottoman Empire created 
a danger for the state not just militarily but also in terms of political and religious 
legitimacy. A radical Shi’i movement that evolved from Sufism had an appeal for 
Turcoman tribes. Politically, due to the Ottoman state’s centralization and oppressive 
policies against Turcoman groups, the Safavid Empire was also seen as an alternative to 
the Ottoman state by the Turcoman groups who were struggling with these policies and 
were willing to support the Safavids not only religiously but also politically (Boyar 2013, 
74, 131; Lewis 1995, 113; Imber 2006, 55; Shaw 1976, 76-78; Bacque-Gammont 1991, 
206-207; Hodgson 1993, 24; Hadidi 1991, 385-386).  
 
The sixteenth century was not a monolithic period for the Ottoman Empire regarding state 
policies that were adopted against the Safavids. Starting from the time of Bayezid II the 
Ottoman state was aware of the threat that the Safavids posed. Although Bayezid II 
refrained from entering into open war with the Safavids, he took precautions with the aim 
of increasing security and cutting the interaction between Shah Ismail of the Safavids and 
his adherents in Anatolia (Emecen 2009, 323-331; Shaw 1976, 78). The Safavid 
supporters who went to Iran were either killed or exiled to Mora (Emecen 2009, 329-
331ü; Zarinebaf Shahr 1997, 6; Lewis 1995, 113; Imber 2006, 33; Basque-Gammont 
1991, 207; Boyar 2013, 202). Prior to the sixteenth century there was not religious 
homogeneity in the Ottoman Empire or a unified Sunni Islam with clear-cut borders. 
There were mixed religious features, and a high degree of syncretism in religious attitudes 
(Terzioğlu 2013, 307-308).  
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By 1520, starting with the reign of Selim I the Ottoman state adopted new policies against 
the developments that threatened it. The state took on the religious and political mission 
of preventing the Safavid threat and the spread of its religious understanding that 
threatened Sunni Islam. Political and religious supporters of the Safavids were surveilled 
and recorded, and efforts were made to prevent their interaction with the Safavid state. 
Various trade and communication sanctions and prohibitions were applied by the 
Ottoman state, and a stricter religious understanding was brought into the political system. 
Sunni teachings and understandings were spread to all levels of the state and social life. 
By this aim certain precautions were taken. The Ottoman state reinforced Sunni Islam 
and developed discourses for religious polemics. The state tried to consolidate its official 
ideology and approach (Emecen 2009, 145, 171-173; Emecen 20015, 89-97, 101-102). 
Confessionalization attempts also gained momentum. In addition to an actual war 
between shah and sultan, a war of propaganda broke out between Sunni belief and Shi’i 
belief. Both the Ottomans and Safavids called each other heretics and rebels and tried to 
suppress Shi’i and Sunni Islam in their respective lands with confessionalization efforts 
as protectors of “true Islamic belief.” (Imber 2006, 57-58; Lewis 1995, 113-114; Faroqhi 
and Fleet 2013, 11, 107).  
 
In the Ottoman Empire the Safavid shah and his followers, and anyone who might 
sympathize with them, became heretics. Alliance with the Safavids by certain individuals 
and groups that were historically named Kızılbaş was seen as a heresy by the state from 
two dimensions: religious because it challenged the Sunni Muslim identity of the Ottoman 
sultan, and political because it recognized the Safavid shah as the legitimate political 
leader (Peirce 2003, 256-258, 262). In this context, the state started to define Sunni Islam 
and asserted it as the only form of Islam that was acceptable for the state. This put other 
interpretations and practices of Islam under the suppression and persecution of the state. 
The communities in Anatolia which were associated with the Safavid Empire were the 
main undesired groups in this regard and were subjected to various accusations and 
persecutions. 
 
These policies were continued and strengthened in the reign of Suleyman I (the 
Magnificent). Prominent concerns in the discourse during this period were legitimacy, 
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the control of the newly conquered territories, and universalistic imperial ideology in the 
Ottoman Empire. Starting from the second half of the fifteenth century bureaucratic state 
formation gained momentum in the Ottoman Empire, and a program of centralization, 
bureaucratization, and consolidation of all areas of government was enforced. Power was 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of the sultan and his agents with new policies and 
institutional arrangements such as the establishment of a learned hierarchy. The military 
and bureaucratic structure were organized around the sultan as the sole sovereign in the 
imperial center. Absolute patrimonial rule strengthened with the combination of justice 
and authority. Resistance to the sultan and his authority was not tolerated, and all attempts 
in that direction were suppressed or contained (Barkey 1996, 46; Atçıl 2017, 49-59; Şahin 
2013, 3).  
 
As part of the empire- making process, new law codes were written, bringing 
systematization and standardization to the legal system. The system of courts and the 
police surveillance network were expanded to enforce the law. Local courts were 
integrated into the empire-wide legal system with a set of legal reforms and criminal law. 
The courts’ legalistic posture had a religious orientation. Ottoman criminal justice policy 
and practice were applied in a combination of Sultanic law (kânûn) and Hanafi Islamic 
law (sharia). They became intertwined and mutually legitimized by Ebusuud’s efforts. 
Through these developments Islamic legal posts of jurisconsult (mufti) and judge (kadı) 
were positioned ideologically and financially under the authority of the sultan. Order and 
the sultan’s sovereignty were to be maintained and protected through the courts and legal 
system (Barkey 1996, 29). Kadıs not only guaranteed that society would preserve its 
Sunni identity, but they also weakened the heterodox and independent religious forces 
because of their centrist and legalistic character and their ideological connections to the 
center (Zilfi 1988, 26; Barkey 1996; 38-39). 
 
The process of state centralization and bureaucratization contributed to religious 
orthodoxy and confessionalization. Following this ideology and policy, law, particularly 
the law of heresy, was reformed via new fatwas, with unique laws for Safavids and 
associated groups in Anatolia in a way that aligned with the aims of the state. Based on 
this renewed ideology, policy, and law the Ottoman state made certain accusations against 
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the Kızılbaş communities in its territories, as a whole or individually, in accordance with 
the framework with which they defined them in the sixteenth century. In official legal 
documents people who are identified as Kızılbaş, râfizî, murtadd, mülhid, ehl-i fesâd2, or 
through a combination of these terms were ordered to be punished, investigated, or 
reported to the center. They were accused of debasing, denying, or not complying with 
Sunni Islamic values, practices, or individuals in various forms through acts or words. 
These acts were seen to be contrary or dangerous to Sunni Islam, the community, and the 
state, as well as not in compliance with state-prescribed Islam and thus non-Islamic or 
heretical. Also, they were accused of certain acts that caused a menace to state security. 
 
 
1.1. Scholarly Works on the History of the Kızılbaş 
 
 
Scholars have examined various characteristics and components of Alevîlik, Kızılbaşlık, 
and Râfizîlik3 in Anatolia during the Ottoman period. In their analyses, they have mostly 
looked at the position of these groups in Islamic belief and practice, focused on tensions 
between these groups and the state, and highlighted political controversies, particularly 
with regard to the Safavids, and the groups’ contribution to the establishment of the 
Safavid Empire and the problems that they caused to the Ottoman Empire.  
 
In relation to the construction of Turkish history and the differentiation between orthodox 
and heterodox Islam, Fuat Köprülü wrote his work Islam in Anatolia as a counter thesis 
to Franz Babinger’s work which claims that the Seljuks belonged to a heretical sect of 
Islam. They were Alevî, which according to Babinger was tantamount to Shi’i Islam. 
Babinger wrote that the Turks were Iranized and imbued with Shi’i beliefs, and that all 
aspects of their life existence were under the influence of Iran. Accordingly, the Ottomans 
 
 
 
2 See section 2 for an explanation of these terms. 
3 See section 2 for an explanation of these terms. 
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and other beyliks whose origins were vague had in fact inherited the Seljuks’ religious 
traditions. Forms of Sufism such as Mevlevilik and Bektâşîlik which were closer to 
Alevîlik in certain aspects had thus given shape to the spiritual life of the Ottomans. When 
the Ottomans reasserted their power as Orthodox Muslims, Iranian Sufis tried to 
undermine and eliminate the Ottoman state’s Sunni religious discourse (Babinger 1922, 
126-152; Köprülü 1993, 14-17). Looking at the issue from a political aspect, Köprülü 
shows that in the fifteenth century the emerging power in Iran, the Safavids, began to 
threaten the Ottoman state directly as their teaching spread through Anatolia. The political 
and religious incursions of the Safavids manifested themselves in rebellions and 
assassinations. The Ottoman state started the process of the elimination of Shi’is in the 
empire with the Kızılbaş communities in Anatolia (Babinger 1922, 126-152; Köprülü 
1993, 14-17). Köprülü finds Babinger’s identification of Turks with Alevîlik erroneous 
(Karakaya-Stump 2015, 18). 
 
According to Köprülü, the Turkish folk Islam of the nomadic Turks, which was syncretic 
and heterodox, was a mixture of Islamic and pre-Islamic belief systems. It was an 
extension of Central Asian Shamanism and popular Sufism. Turcoman babas, mainly 
from the Yesevîyye movement, a branch of Melâmîyye from Central Asia, Khwarazm, and 
Khorasan, were thus seen as the Islamized version of the old Turkish kam/ozan (Köprülü 
1993, 5-6, 11; Karakaya-Stump 2015, 186). Popular Shi’i doctrine and Bâtınî ideas found 
their way into the nomadic Turcoman clans by means of babas from various tarîkats 
because these Melâmî, Kalenderî, and Haydari movements were very close to the old 
religious practices of Turkish tribes (Karakaya-Stump 2015, 186; Köprülü 1993, 13; 
Köprülü 1996, 49-51). Although some of them eventually settled into Islamic cities, most 
of these babas remained in nomadic Turcoman clans and eventually led the politico-
religious insurgencies starting with the Babai rebellion in Anatolia against first the 
Seljuks, then the Ottomans, who both followed a policy of favoring and defending 
Sunnism (Köprülü 1993, 11, 13, 31). Therefore, according to Köprülü, this polarized, and 
sharply divided “high” and “low” Islam eventually clashed in Anatolia in both the Seljuk 
and the Ottoman empires (Köprülü 1993, 31; Karakaya-Stump 2015, 186). 
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Ahmet Yaşar Ocak and Irene Melikoff follow a similar line of thought with Köprülü in 
separating between orthodox and heterodox Islam and relating this to Turkish history. 
Ocak considers the religion of certain Turcoman groups to be heterodox Islam. According 
to him Alevîlik and Bektâşîlik were the epitome of Turkish folk Islam (Ocak 2000, 131, 
136, 138). Newly migrated Turcoman masses in Anatolia had not cut ties with their 
previous beliefs, and among them there were dervish groups from various tarîkats who 
also came to Anatolia to escape from the Mongol invasion and spread their religious-
spiritual ideas. There were also dervishes who opted to settle in cities and appealed to the 
upper classes with their spiritual ideas. Spiritual Islam appealed to nomadic and 
seminomadic communities in Anatolia because it was seen to be similar to the old beliefs 
of these nomadic communities. Ocak has ideas similar to Köprülü regarding the Islamic 
beliefs of these communities and calls it folk spiritual Islam, and heterodox Islam (Ocak 
1980, 41-42, 52).  
 
Ocak also focuses on the political side of the matter as he demonstrates how this 
heterodox Islamic understanding, which was closer to Shi’ism than Sunnism, along with 
economic, political, and social reasons including taxation or the exclusion of these groups 
from governmental posts, caused clashes between heterodox Islamic groups led by 
dervishes and Sunni groups (Ocak 2000, 137, 154; Ocak 1980, 62-67). At the same time, 
folk or heterodox Islam which did not include the cult of Ali was transformed into 
Kızılbaşlık through Safavid propaganda and the influence of Shah Ismail’s Safavid 
Empire (Ocak 2000, 137, 145). The centralization, settlement, and tax policies of the state 
towards nomadic tribes in Anatolia as well as the messianic propaganda of the Safavids 
pushed these communities towards the Safavids and created an affiliation with them 
(Ocak 2000, 147-148, 153-154; Ocak 1980, 62-65). Ocak further states that “heretical” 
movements in Ottoman society were not religious movements caused by theological 
discussions, but in fact seem to have been socio-political reactions of political and social 
discontent created by the dissolution of the classical regime. According to Ocak, the 
Ottomans were more interested in the political aspect of these movements rather than 
their religious aspect. The Ottomans were concerned about the threat that they posed to 
its sovereignty, but when dealing with them the Ottoman state utilized the language of 
religion (Ocak 2013, 386-387) Hence, the Ottoman central administration judged these 
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groups to be outside of Islam by identifying them as kızılbaş as well as râfizî, mülhid, 
zındîk, and ehl-i fesâd as they remained outside of Sunni Islam (Ocak 2000, 150). 
 
Like Ocak, Mustafa Akdağ interprets the acts of Kızılbaş groups or individuals in the 
framework of a socio-political reaction. Akdağ considers the tension and aggravation 
between various segments of society, including the Kızılbaş and the central authority, 
through their socioeconomic dimensions. He attributes the cause of these tensions and 
uprisings to the socioeconomic conditions of the period, which had a negative effect on 
standards of living and security. Starting from the sixteenth century the internal order of 
the state deteriorated, and according to Akdağ the Kızılbaş segments could not integrate 
into the state and remained. Although they were excluded from socio-political life 
because of their beliefs, these segments became oppositional and a threat to the state 
mainly because of the economic constraints, sanctions, heavy taxation, and the bad 
administration that they faced in the Ottoman Empire. Because of this and in hope of 
finding new economic means they supported and migrated to Iran. They also revolted 
against the Ottoman state because for these same reasons. After the discontent started 
among the Turcoman segments, the peasant masses who left their lands and fief-holders 
who lost their fiefs due to bad economic conditions joined them in these revolts. Kızılbaş 
groups were part of these revolts which emerged by the common participation of the 
masses (Akdağ 1995, 15, 115, 117, 120, 122).  
 
Following the Köprülü-Ocak line, Irene Melikoff and Ethem Ruhi Fığlalı make similar 
claims and evaluations. They have different analyses on certain points, and they give their 
attention to other matters which Köprülü and Ocak do not pay much attention in their 
work. Yet, both Melikoff and Fığlalı emphasize that nomadic groups had not lost their 
old beliefs and that they combined them with Islamic beliefs and developed folk Islam as 
a result. They agree that dervish groups had an impact on Turcoman communities and 
that with these groups they caused social insurgencies in Anatolia starting with the Babai 
revolt (Fığlalı 1996, 103, 105, 121-122, 126; Melikoff 1993, 55, 66, 101-102, 105-106). 
Fığlalı, like Köprülü drawing a distinction between high and low Islam, claims that 
Turcoman groups and their sheiks cannot be marked as heterodox, although they had 
remnants of their old beliefs (Fığlalı 1996, 87, 90, 109-110). He also states that the state 
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tolerated these different dervish groups until the end of the fifteenth century. Unlike 
Köprülü and Ocak, he and Melikoff explain the different treatment that was shown to the 
Bektâşî order in contrast to the treatment shown to other Turcoman groups who were 
Alevi Turcomani They claim that while Bektâşîlik was associated with the janissaries and 
was accepted and elevated by the Ottoman authority with the purpose of containing and 
controlling elements in society, the main Turcoman group  named Kızılbaş  by the 
political authority were seen as heretical and persecuted in many ways. This might be the 
reason for their inclination to the Safavid side and Safavid sheiks’ influence over them 
(Fığlalı 1996, 127-131; Melikoff 1993, 56-57). Mehmet Eröz in his work also follows the 
Köprülü-Ocak tradition in terms of the Turcoman communities’ religion and offers the 
same analysis as Fığlalı and Melikoff regarding the different treatment of Bektasilik and 
Alevîlik by the Ottoman state and the adherence of Kızılbaş groups to the Safavids (Eröz 
1990, 89-90, 95). 
 
Faruk Sümer and Adel Allouche also write that the Ottoman-Safavid relationship and the 
issue of the Kızılbaş communities took shape because of political concerns and threats 
towards state security. These include rebellions that were orchestrated by the Safavid 
Empire employing Kızılbaş communities, the intervention of the Safavids in the struggles 
for the Ottoman throne, Safavids politico-religious propaganda targeting certain 
communities, the mass migration of these communities to Iran, the direct borders of the 
Safavid Empire in eastern and southern Anatolia that had been established with the active 
contribution of Kızılbaş communities, and the Safavid relationship with the 
Karamanoğulları, the Akkoyunlu-Karakoyunlu, the Mamluks, and Venice that disrupted 
Ottoman interests and control in the region. According to Sümer, without the Kızılbaş 
Turcomans in Anatolia, let alone emergence of the Safavid state, the sheiks of Erdebil 
could not even have had political aims (Sümer 1976, 16, 19, 22, 24, 29, 34-38; Allouche 
1983, 87-91, 96-98, 100, 104-105, 114, 128). Certain Ottoman state policies towards 
these groups such as taxation and religious accusations regarding for not having the “true” 
form of Islam caused resentment among Kızılbaş groups and consequently gave way to 
new “security concerns” (Allouche 1983, 104). The outcomes of these security concerns 
were the aggressive offensive policies which were applied by the Ottoman state against 
the Safavids and their supporters’ policies in political stance and the punishment of these 
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communities based on their religious features that were identified by the state via renewed 
laws and legal definitions and justifications (Allouche 1983, 100-105, 110-112; Sümer 
1976, 40-41). 
 
Saim Savaş is one of the more recent followers of this approach. Savaş argues that various 
causes led to the emergence of the Kızılbaş as a problem for the Ottoman state in the 
sixteenth century. According to him the emergence of the Kızılbaş problem in the 
Ottoman state was the result of three factors. First, the emergence of the Safavids as a 
state with a different sect in Iran, and their expansionist policies towards Anatolia. 
Second, the harsh applications of the centralization policies of the Ottoman state in the 
eastern regions of Anatolia. Third, the social structure of the Kızılbaş elements that were 
suitable for Safavid religious propaganda due to their religious features, and which were 
in opposition to the centralization polices of the Ottoman Empire due to their tribal 
lifestyle in the territories which both states wanted to dominate (Savaş 2013, 147). This 
turned Turcoman communities and the Kızılbaş to the side of Shah Ismail, whom they 
saw as a savior and as similar to themselves in terms of religion, values, and lifestyle 
(Ocak 2016, 216; Savaş 2013, 8). The course of events ended with the persecution of 
Kızılbaş groups based on accusations that aimed to show them as marginal groups in the 
eyes of larger society, in order to intimidate and suppress them. Hence, according to 
Savaş, the accusations and persecution were related directly to the Kızılbaş communities’ 
social life, relations, discourse, and beliefs (Savaş 2013, 28; Refik 1932, 23). 
 
A revisionist line in historiography, on the other hand, argues against straightforward 
categorizations in terms of orthodox and heterodox groups, and against the linear 
development of sunnitization. This line of historiography finds certain approaches too 
normative and lacking in more nuanced dimensions. Ayşe Baltacıoğlu shows that Kızılbaş 
groups cannot be considered a single category and that the Ottoman state’s measures 
against them varied from group to group depending on the conditions and the time. 
Baltacıoğlu claims that there was a more complex relationship between the state and the 
Kızılbaş with varying policies, from financial support to the Safeviyye order and some 
Kızılbaş subjects, to the execution of members of the same group (Baltacıoğlu 2014, 319-
320). Baltacıoğlu also draws attention to the diversity in geography and ethnicity of 
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Kızılbaş groups. Therefore, by neglecting degrees of diversity among these groups, it is 
misleading to relegate all interaction between the Ottoman state and Kızılbaş groups to 
suppression and persecution. Baltacıoğlu writes against the argument of an 
uncompromising Sunni identity as a reason for the state’s policies of suppression and 
focuses on the Kızılbaş threat against the state. According to her thesis, three main 
dynamics affected the various policies that were employed: the changing relationship 
between the Ottoman state and the Safavids, the Kızılbaş’ tax evasion, and their 
conversion. Thus, Baltacıoğlu brings more of a “political identity focus” to the subject 
(Baltacıoğlu 2014, 319-320). 
 
Likewise, Karen Barkey claims that the Ottoman Empire did not shift directly from a 
policy of toleration to a policy of persecution in its treatment of various non-conforming 
groups, and that non-conforming groups cannot be considered a single entity or a single 
group (Barkey 2008, 162-168, 175-178). Barkey argues that the policies of persecution 
of Kızılbaş and Safavid supporters were applied when these communities were perceived 
as a political threat to the security and stability of the Ottoman state and its consolidating 
Sunni identity. The religious character of these groups became oppositional for the state 
when the state became more rigid through centralization, bureaucratization, and 
ideological Sunnitization It persecuted those who did not accept these changes and new 
arrangements. Hence not all groups were persecuted, and certain groups such as Bektaşi 
and Halveti were incorporated into the normative order of the state because they accepted 
the new structure. The others that refused to be bound by the new order, namely the 
Kızılbaş groups, were persecuted as a solution (Barkey 2008, 162-165, 175-178). 
 
Further stressing the political motives and context, Marcus Dressler argues that the 
“religious dichotomy” between the Ottomans and the Safavids was a product of the 
Ottoman-Safavid rivalry rather than its cause. The Safavids and the Ottomans employed 
similar discourses and arguments against each other, including millenarian Mahdism, 
charismatic leadership, and a mutual claim of the other as heretic-heterodox. Dressler 
claims that the fear and persecution of the Kızılbaş groups by the Ottoman state was not 
due to their religious understanding but because of their association with Iran and 
allegiance to the shah. Dressler also states that the definition of Kızılbaş is not well- 
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established, but rather is ambiguous, and that all the characteristics of a Kızılbaş as 
defined in Ottoman decrees ordering their persecution could also be attributed to other 
Shi’i groups and Sufi tarîkats (Dressler 2005, 151-152, 155-156, 159, 163-165, 169-170). 
 
Ayfer Karakaya-Stump argues that the definition of heterodoxy and orthodoxy cannot be 
determined solidly and normatively for Islam due to the lack of a highest authority. 
Instead, the politically most powerful group had the means and the power to assert the 
borders of orthodoxy and define the others as heterodoxy. According to Karakaya-Stump, 
putting a solid border between high and low Islam is erroneous because it neglects the 
evaluation of different religious facts in their own context and de-historicizes the issue. It 
is misleading to put all these “heterodox” groups and their beliefs into a single category 
by stating that they had a superficial understanding of Islam vis-à-vis the commonly 
accepted Islamic understanding and by giving concrete definitions of orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy as if they are objective terms. According to Karakaya-Stump, the view of folk 
Islam as the continuation of pre-Islamic Turkic belief systems under the veneer of Islam 
is not correct (Karakaya-Stump 2005, 188-189). 
 
Derin Terzioğlu argues that the shi’itization of Islam by tarîkats, the Mongol invasions, 
mixed religious practices, and understandings from previous beliefs led to the blurring of 
confessional identities so that we cannot talk about orthodox and heterodox Islam. She 
claims that there was a confessionalization of Sunnism to some extent in the early modern 
Ottoman period, but that it was a continuation of pre-existing tendencies and was a result 
of multiple causes such as centralization and bureaucratization, not just a political 
response to the Safavids and their Shi’ism. She states that the Ottoman state applied 
harsher policies to the groups that it identified as heretics by law and saw as a threat, 
including the Kızılbaş, but applied softer policies towards those which seemed less 
threatening to political authority like certain Sufi orders (Terzioğlu 2013, 305, 307-309). 
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1.2. Aim of This Work 
 
 
This thesis is interested in the relationship between the Ottoman state and its own subjects. 
It does not aim to explore the political struggles between the Ottomans and the Safavids, 
nor does it go into a religious analysis. It aims to categorize the accusations and offences 
that were made against the Kızılbaş by the state based on their type, content, and 
similarities. The examples studied here either reflect the religious sensitivities of the state 
or its political interests. The Ottoman state identified and defined certain acts as offences 
because they violated its “religious” and/or “political” goals. By “content” I refer to what 
the acts violated, which could be the main principles of the Sunni Islam, state-prescribed 
Islam in relation to public morality or state security, or both. I also identify those issues 
that show a likeness to each other in terms of their features, and produce a categorization 
based on similarity. 
 
This work traces the direct and indirect connections between these offences and the 
Kızılbaş, and the commitment of these offences by Kızılbaş individuals or groups. The 
significance, connection, and meaning of the offences in the given examples either refer 
directly to the Kızılbaş, or the offender is directly identified as a Kızılbaş; in this sense I 
refer to direct and indirect accusations against the Kızılbaş. It is also possible to find both 
to be true in a single case. Based on these, rather than taking each offence or derivatives 
of one offence as a single category or presenting them without any categorization, this 
work offers a broad classification of the offences that were made against the Kızılbaş. 
The present examination questions whether it is possible to categorized them and attribute 
any “religious” or “political” quality to them offences in a clear-cut way. Within this 
framework, this thesis explores the possibilities of categorization. The thesis also 
examines whether there are any overlaps between the categories and if so according to 
what criteria. 
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1.3. Sources That Contribute  
 
 
This thesis uses transcribed and printed primary sources, mainly Mühimme Defterleri 
(MD) the fatwa collections of Sarıgörez Hamza, Ebusuud, and Kemalpaşazade and Kadı 
Sicil of Üsküdar. Mühimme Defterleri ontain the records of domestic and external that 
were seen in the great divan, and record the decisions made about important military, 
political, administrative, economic, cultural, and social issues (Başbakanlık Osmanlı 
Arşivi Rehberi 2010, 3, 7, 8). In the context of this thesis, they shed light on the 
relationship between the Ottoman state and the individuals and groups which were 
historically known as Kızılbaş. There are various and numerous mühimme records that 
deal with Kızılbaş individuals and groups as criminal suspects or offenders within a legal 
context. Through these registers, we learn about the various practices regarding the 
criminal procedure related to the Kızılbaş.  
 
A fatwa is a jurist consult’s opinion that is given about a particular issue. Hence, legally 
it is not binding. Fatwas have an important place in the functioning of Islamic and 
Ottoman law. Fatwas were given upon an individual’s request regarding matters of 
private law, and upon the request of the state regarding matters of public law. The 
Ottoman state as an Islamic state also needed them for the explanation, legalization, and 
legitimization of all kinds of actions and regulations in the eyes of the religious authorities 
and the public. Therefore, fatwas that were issued in the Ottoman Empire, especially the 
fatwa compilations of the great şeyhülislâms, shed light on social, economic, 
administrative, political, judicial, private, and public life in the Ottoman Empire 
(Akgündüz 1972, 5-6; Inanır 2008, 62, 64, 67). Regarding the Kızılbaş issue and their 
treatment by the Ottoman state, these fatwas provide information on the legitimizing 
religio-legal grounds for the state and the ways in which the state took measures vis-à-vis 
the Kızılbaş.  
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1.4.  Outline of the Thesis 
 
 
After this introductory chapter, the second chapter of this work explains the various 
religio-legal and religio-political terms that were used by the Ottoman şeyhülislâms and 
by the Ottoman state to define certain groups based on their beliefs and religious leanings. 
Here I focus on the Ottoman state’s perception of apostasy, heresy, and unbelief vis-à-vis 
Sunni Islam, and how the state defined and categorized apostasy, heresy, unbelief, and 
other kinds of “unacceptable” conducts and legitimized and justified countermeasures 
against them. The second chapter also contains the practical measures that şeyhülislâms 
prescribed for these communities. The third chapter deals with Ottoman criminal law, 
focusing on its components, procedure, agents, and process, and examining how the state 
employed it. The fourth chapter analyzes the accusations that were made against Kızılbaş 
individuals and groups.  Here I explore the various kinds of offences stated in the 
Mühimme Defterleri and offer a categorization of them. The last chapter offers some 
conclusions. 
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2. RELIGIO-LEGAL AND RELIGIO-POLITICAL TERMS AND 
PRACTICAL MEASURES 
 
 
 
2.1. The Main Religio-Legal Terms in Ottoman Fatwas and Other Legal 
Documents 
 
 
In Ottoman fatwas and other legal documents, Alevî-Kızılbaş communities were defined 
in the religio-legal categories of Kızılbaş, râfizî, zındîk, mülhid, bâgî, kâfir, murtadd, and 
ehl-i fesâd. 
 
Even though each of these categories were different, all of them were defined as religious 
sins. They implied different religious misconducts and/or punishable acts and different 
penalties. There are two approaches in the historiography regarding the employment of 
these terms by Ottoman scholars to refer to the Safavids and their adherents i.e. the 
Kızılbaş. One approach claims that in the Ottoman legal context the accusations using 
these terms and their content were made for mainly political reasons, rather than religious 
ones. According to this approach, identification by these terms and accusations became 
widespread when the political authority could no longer tolerate dissenting thoughts and 
acts. There was a parallel between the increasing Safavid threat against the political 
integrity of the Ottoman state and an increase in the accusations of ilhâd (being mülhid) 
and zendeka (being zindîk) (Erünsal 2004, 129-130). While the second approach agrees 
that the Ottoman political appaatus used a Sunni identity and ideology against the 
Safavids, their supporters, and Shi’i Islam, it claims that Sunni identity as shaped by the 
Ottoman şeyhülislâms was not uniform. Also, the Ottoman şeyhülislâms identified these 
groups by the said terms independently from state policies. According to this view, they 
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were not acting as duty-bound state officials to legitimize the actions of the state but as 
independent producers and interpreters of the law. They employed and used these terms 
differently from each other in certain regards and accused specific groups from a religious 
perspective with religio-legal opinions and reasons (Atçıl 2017, 295-296, 310-311). 
 
Both approaches have merits. On the one hand, the Ottoman state needed a justification 
for its political actions against the Safavid threat within its borders that might not be seen 
as legitimate by some segments of society. As an lslamic state, the justification of 
Ottoman acts such as war and the persecution of the Kızılbaş had to be through religious 
authorities i.e. şeyülislams. In a continuously centralizing and bureaucratizing state 
structure, the ulema class, which became a part of the state apparatus, had to comply with 
state interests to a certain degree, willingly or unwillingly. On the other hand, different 
interpretations of the Kızılbaş issue from the religio-legal point of view by various 
Ottoman şeyhülislâms and their decisions regarding the treatment of the Safavids and 
Kızılbaş that did not fit well with the interests of the state shows that şeyhülislâms 
bypassed the state and its interests from time to time and acted more as interpreters of law 
with religious concerns rather than as official state agents with political concerns. The 
religio-legal definitions and approaches of particular Ottoman şeyhülislâms regarding the 
identification and treatment of the Kızılbaş issue need to be examined because the 
Ottoman state related to these various religious approaches in different ways throughout 
the sixteenth century. 
 
 
2.1.1. Intertwined Religio-Legal Terms: Murtadd (Apostate), Kâfir (Unbeliever), 
and Mülhid (Heretic) 
 
Prominent Ottoman şeyhülislâms of the sixteenth century offered a variety of 
explanations and usages of murtadd for Kızılbaş groups. İrtidad (apostasy) can happen 
through words or actions in Islam. When a Muslim openly speaks or behaves in a way 
that shows that he denies the rules of faith, mocks Islamic values or symbols, or enters 
another religion or relapses from Islam, that person commits the crime / sin of irtidâd, 
and hence becomes murtad. Although there are some disputes about what constitutes 
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irtidâd, some actions (and sometimes involving words) that are commonly considered 
irtidâd are: insulting Allah and the prophets, claiming to be a prophet, denying or 
disgracing the Quran or the other holy books and angels, dressing like a nonbeliever with 
the intent of looking like one, denying religious practices, and idolatry (İnce 2008, 89-91; 
Özçelik 2000, 347-348; Ince 1995, 12, 42-47). Quashing of the conviction, hence of the 
hadd punishment (punishment for the violation of the God’s rights) is possible with 
repentance except in the case of insulting the prophet (Peters 2005, 65). In all madhabs 
(Sunni Islamic sects) except the Hanafi, the invitation of the murtadd to Islam is 
compulsory, while in the Hanafi madhab it is recommended as mustahab (an appreciated 
or a good act) because the murtadd was “honored” once by choosing the Islamic faith, so 
there is no compulsion to invite them again (Peters 2005, 65; Ince 1995, 69). 
 
Some şeyhülislâms did not use the term murtad. Instead they used mülhid, zındîk, kâfir, 
and ehl-i fesâd, which became intertwined with the content and context of murtadd. First 
prominent şeyhülislam of the sixteenth century, Sarıgörez Hamza in his fatwas, defines 
the Safavids, as well as people who accept, support, and have sympathy towards them as 
tâife-i Kızılbaş (Kızılbaş groups/communities) and kâfir wa-mülhid (heretical 
unbelievers), because of their beliefs and actions that seriously diverged from the 
boundaries of shariah. He locates them outside of Islam. His understanding of kufr wa 
ilhâd (heretical unbelief) encompasses several offences that include irtidâd, kufr, and 
ilhâd. After enumerating their offences, such as debasing the Quran and insulting the four 
caliphs, he defines them and their sympathizers as unbelievers and apostates.4 Although 
he does not use the term irtidâd, kufr wa ilhâd contains the crime of irtidâd for him. 
According to him the Safavids and Kızılbaş are not regular murtadd but zındîk (heretic), 
and therefore they do not have the right to repent. He categorizes the Kızılbaş not only as 
kâfir and mülhid but also as ehl-i fesâd and says that they threaten the basis of the Islamic 
community and deserve to be executed since “all of this community is both kâfir, mülhid, 
 
 
 
4 “ol zikr olunan taife-i kâfirlerdür ve mülhidlerdür ve dahi her kimse ki anlara meyl idüb ol batıl dinlerine razı ve 
muavin olalar, onlar dahi kâfirler ve mülhidlerdür”. 
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and ehl-i fesâd, [and the] killing of this community is necessary because they are both 
kafir and  mülhid ”5 due to their crimes of heretical unbelief and brigandage (Tekindağ 
1967, 54-55; Atçıl 2017, 299-300). 6 
 
Kemalpaşazade considers the Kızılbaş kâfir as well, but unlike Sarıgörez he puts the 
Safavids and their followers into the category of kâfir wa-murtadd (apostates and 
unbelievers) rather than kâfir wa-mulhid (heretical unbelievers). He lists similar offences 
to those stated by Sarıgörez, and claims that these offences are the clear signs of kufr and 
ilhâd and states that they are to be treated like murtadd.7 He recognizes the right of 
repentance, however he makes a distinction between kâfir wa-murtadd and zındîk 
regarding repentance and states that the category of zındîk, which includes the Kızılbaş 
groups, does not have the right to repentance and cannot escape execution (Atçıl 2017, 
302-304; Teber 2005, 202-203). 
 
For Ebusuud, the Safavids and their supporters are murtadd, and therefore more 
despicable than other kâfirs. Ebusuud categorizes any sign of kufr or unorthodox practice 
within the category of murtadd. For example, he claims that if anybody does raks (dance) 
and a similar movement, devran, as a form of worship he becomes murtadd (Düzdağ 
1972, 85, 134; Akgündüz 1972, 122-124). By attributing to the Kızılbaş similar offenses 
as did Sarıgörez and Kemalpaşazade, and by claiming that “they took various wickedness 
and immorality from each sect and added them to the unbelief and innovation of their 
own choice” (Atçıl 2017, 307-308) he identifies the Kızılbaş groups as murtadd, as well 
as kâfir, bâgî, and ehl-i fesâd (Atçıl 2017, 307-308; Akgündüz 1972, 119-120; Düzdağ 
1972, 109-111).8 Regarding repentance, unlike Sarıgörez and Kemalpaşazade, Ebusuud 
underlines the primacy of the sultanic decisions by referring to two groups of early 
 
 
 
5 “bil-cümle bu taife hem kâfir ve mülhidlerdür ve hem ehl-i fesâddur, iki cihedden katil(leri) vacibdür” in Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 “Biz onların küfürlerinden ve mürted olduklarından asla şüphe etmeyiz... bunlara uygulanacak olan hüküm mürtedlere 
uygulanacak olan hükümdür” Fetevâ-yı Kemâl Pâşâ-Zâde Der Hakk-ı Kızılbâş.  
8 “Her birinden bir miktar şer ve fesâd alıp, kendiler hevalarınca ihtiyar ettikleri küfr ü bid'atlere ilhak edip, bir mezhebi 
küfr ü dalalet ihtira' eylemişlerdir”. 
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şeyhülislâms; one that accepted the right of repentance and the other that did not, and 
stating that the imam or the sultan could choose from either approach, that is to accept or 
reject the right of repentance according to the situation (Atçıl 2017, 309). 
 
Hence, by the sixteenth century Ottoman şeyhülislâms held that murtadd was similar to 
kâfir and mülhid as they encompassed one another’s features, and murtadd could include 
many accusations and penalties in a way to serve as justification for the punishment of 
the Kızılbaş and the wars against the Safavids. 
 
 
2.1.2. Separate Religio-Legal Terms (with Social Implications for the Latter 
Two): Zındîk, Ehl-i Fesâd, And Bâgî 
 
A zındîk is someone who holds any kind of unorthodox or heretical belief and engages 
practices against the central orthodox Islamic dogma. At the same time the term is 
employed for free thinkers, agnostics, atheists, etc. Starting from tenth century the 
meaning of zındîk expanded and it became criminally offensive to hold beliefs and follow 
practices that were contrary to the central dogmas of Islam (Langer and Udo 2008, 284). 
Consequently, the term was similar to kâfir and murtadd (Lewis 1953, 55; Ocak 2013, 
71). 
 
The definition and explanation of zındîk by classical scholars such as Ghazali and 
Tamiyya provided a basis for later religious thinkers and ulema. Ghazali uses zındîk in a 
similar way to murtadd and states that zındîk hide their infidelity, i.e. the kufr (Ghazali 
1993, 98-100). In the Ottoman Empire zındîk as a legal category was used for Kızılbaş 
for the first time by Kemalpaşazade in his Risala of Zendeka. He describes the Kızılbaş 
as people who have the appearance of Muslims and the souls of kâfirs (Üstün 1991, 46). 
According to him, a zındîk disregards Allah, does not recognize his uniqueness, and does 
not accept Mohammed’s prophecy, while also hiding his denial (Düzenli 2007, 152). 
Kemalpaşazade also defines murtadd and zındîk and distinguishes them from each other. 
The difference between them is that a zındîk might be considered a murtadd, but a 
murtadd is not considered a zındîk since the former openly shows his kufr. The difference 
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between zendeka and ilhâd is that zendeka is a deception of kufr, but ilhâd means refusing 
and leaving Islam (Ocak 2016, 406-414) According to Kemalpaşazade it is necessary to 
execute zındîks, and their repentance is not acceptable (Ocak 2016, 406-414; Üstün 1991, 
182).9 
 
Unlike Kemalpaşazade, Ebusuud uses zındîk in a broader sense. In his fatwas, being 
zındîk means being atheist, (Düzdağ 1972, 113)10 and therefore it is necessary to kill them. 
He does not directly equate the Kızılbaş with being zındîk because he considers them 
murtadd. Consequently, he codifies zındîk and murtadd with a different specification: 
küfür ilhâd ve zendeka üzere mürted olanlar (the ones who became apostate over unbelief, 
heresy, and secret apostasy). He defines those who act against Sunni Islam to be zındîk 
(Akgündüz 1972, 122-123; Düzdağ 1972, 109). While Sarıgörez does not explicitly 
identify the Kızılbaş as zındîk, he still does not give them the right of repentance, which 
indicates that he did consider them regular murtadd but zındîk, who pretend to be Muslim 
but harbor kufr internally (Atçıl 2017, 300). Therefore, zındîk becomes another definition 
and context for being murtad.  
 
The Ottoman şeyhülislâms also used the term ehl-i fesâd to identify Kızılbaş groups. 
Sarıgörez does not give a clear definition of ehl-i fesâd, however he might have associated 
it with the sharia crime of hiraba (disturbances to society) while identifying the Kızılbaş. 
This crime is punishable by execution. He considers not only their religious beliefs and 
deeds but also their social and political acts in justifying the all-encompassing penalties 
he prescribed for them (Atçıl 2017, 300-301). Ebusuud defines these groups as ehl-i fesâd 
but does not elaborate on it. By looking at his other fatwas that are related to fesâd (petty 
crimes, banditry, or hiraba) and habitual criminals it is understood that he considered the 
Kızılbaş likewise, i.e. ehl-i fesâd according to Hanafi law, who can be subjected to capital 
 
 
 
9 “zındiktır, katli vaciptir, azlolunduktan sonra tevbesi kabul olunmaz.”  
10 “Mes’ele: Zeyd Amr’a “bana Tanrı’yı buluver” dedikte Amr Zeyd’e “Kur’an ile amil olup, Peygamber’e iktida edicek 
bulursun” deyicek, Zeyd “anlara ne amel, ben anlarsız bulurum” yahut “buldum” dese Zeyd’e ne lazım olur? 
Elcevap: Katli lazımdır, zındîktır.”  
22 
 
 
 
punishment by the head of the state (Gerber 1994, 63; Peters 2005, 58; Akgündüz 1972, 
156). 
 
Bâgî was also used by the Ottoman şeyhülislâms while defining the Kızılbaş. Ebusuud 
defines Kızılbaş groups as bâgî. The term is used for a Muslim who rebels against the 
legitimate ruler as the result of a divergent interpretation of scripture. If a non-Muslim 
subject rebels against a legitimate ruler, he is considered a harbi (enemy unbeliever) not 
a bâgî. Therefore, a person or a group cannot be a kâfir and a bâgî at the same time. It 
can be said that Ebusuud analyzed two groups that he gave different religio-legal status 
under the same category (Atçıl 2017, 308). 
 
 
2.2. Religio-Political Terms: Râfizî and Kızılbaş 
 
 
While the Ottoman şeyhülislâms used the terms murtadd, mülhid, kâfir, zındîk, ehl-i 
fesâd, and bâgî to define Kızılbaş individuals and groups, which also provided the basis 
for accusations and charges made against them by the state, the state usually used the 
terms râfizî, Kızılbaş, mülhid, and ehl-i fesâd. In the state language, besides their religious 
connotations these words had non-religious meanings, such as being subversive to the 
state. Although each has its own specific meaning, in documents we see that râfizî and 
Kızılbaş were used synonymously and in an interchangeable way most of the time.  
 
 
2.2.1. Râfizî 
 
The term râfizî signifies a group or person who has deviated from or abandoned an 
opinion and is used for people of the Shi’i belief. There are various opinions about how 
the term emerged. The term’s emergence in the rebellion of Zeyd bin Ali against the 
Umayyads is a very common opinion. Some of his supporters abandoned Zeyd on the 
battleground because he did not deny the caliphate of the first three caliphs despite his 
followers’ wish for him to do so. Zeyd named this group râfizîs (abandoner) because they 
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abandoned him in front of the enemy on the battleground. There are also opinions that 
state that the term was given because these people did not accept the first three caliphs, 
abandoned the common sahâbe opinion, and claimed that the caliphate was the right of 
Ali after the prophet’s death. When these groups became followers of the imâmiyye of 
Shi’i belief, they were also named râfizî by Zeyd supporters as a humiliating word. In 
time the term was and is used to define a branch of imâmiyye, a branch of Shi’i Islam, to 
refer to all Shi’is or imâmiyye of Shi’ism and for the people who deny the caliphate of 
first three caliphs. At the same time the term was used as a slanderous word by Sunni 
Islamic scholars. In return Shi’i scholars attributed positive meanings to the term and used 
it for themselves in a positive way (Benli 2008, 31-69; Öz 2007, 396; Öz 2000, 207-209). 
 
Sunni ulema used the term râfizî for all Shi’i groups, particularly imâmiyye of Shi’ism 
because they refused to recognize the first three caliphs (Öz 2007, 396). The Ottoman 
ulema used the word râfizî to define Bâtınî groups that contained Shi’i features to 
categorize them as persons or communities who abandoned an opinion or a group. The 
word also could be used in the sense of community. Later, this term covered the dervish 
lodges such as those of the Alevî and Bektâşî order that remained outside of the 
widespread Islamic understanding, as well as those of Acem, Kalenderî, and Kızılbaş 
communities that were considered to be Shi’i and to be subversive to the Ottoman state 
(Ocak 1982, 514-516; Öz 2007, 396-397). 
 
In one of his risâles Kemalpaşazade considers râfizîs similar to as Haricis, Kaderiyye, 
Cehmiyye, Neccariyye, Zeydiyye, İmâmiyye, and Kızılbaş. However, according to 
Kemalpaşazade, râfizîs are not equal to Kızılbaş, hence not every Kızılbaş is a râfizî 
because râfizî signifies the groups who are subversive to the current official religious 
understanding, and hence the term includes new religious ideas that refer to the Kızılbaş 
as well as those that do not (Teber 2005, 25, Teber 2007, 27). In the same work 
Kemalpaşazade defines râfizîs as heretic communities, and as bid’atçı (a person who has 
a bad innovation). He states that they need to be called to repent, and if they do not accept, 
they must be killed. According to him, most râfizî are murtadd because they treat Ali as 
a God. In his other risâle “Risâle Fi Tekfiri’r-Ravâfiz” Kemalpaşazade states that râfizî 
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were committing kufr and denounces them as kâfir (Teber 2005, 21-24; Teber 2007, 26-
27).  
 
Before the Ottoman period, we see that the term râfizî was used to define proto-Alevî 
groups in the fourteenth century by Ibn Battuta in his Rihle. In his account Battuta states 
that in Sinop people suspected he and his companions were râfizî and questioned them 
by asking them to eat rabbit. According to him, they ate the rabbit and were thus free from 
suspicion. By this story he shows that in Anatolia there were groups who would later be 
named râfizî-Kızılbaş and that they did not eat rabbit (Ocak 1982, 514-515). In the 
fifteenth century we see the term râfizî in the Saltıknâme of Ebu’l Hayr-ı Rumi who was 
under the patronage of prince Cem. In this account, during his visit to the Kaaba Sarı 
Saltık says that there were many râfizîs in Mecca and Medina, and that they followed the 
heretic path, and like Mutezile and Harici people they were factious and should be killed 
unless they repented. According to the account Saltık killed many of them who did not 
repent (Eb’ul Hayr-ı Rumi 2007, 58). In the part of the work in which he has a 
conversation with the devil, the devil says that he made people call Ali God and that 
râfizîs accepted it, gathering together and causing fesâd in public constantly (Eb’ul Hayr-
ı Rumi 2007, 101). 
 
From these sources we can see that the term râfizî was used at that time to define the 
religious inclination of the groups who considered Ali to be God, and hence were 
considered heretical by Sunni Muslims. In the part where Saltık states that râfizîs captured 
Acem land from İzzeddin, he says that they were malignant and tyrants, that they were 
not good people, and that the prophet cursed them. He also states that malignancy and 
tyranny would come from the land of Acem until the apocalypse and that these people 
came to the land of Rum. He also states that râfizîlik was a part of the Acem community 
and that all Acems were râfizî and should be killed (Eb’ul Hayr-ı Rumi 2007, 137-139, 
143). These show that the term râfizî was used to refer to Iranians who had imâmiyye 
understandings of Shi’ism (Ocak 1982, 515). 
 
Through Ottoman historians and their accounts, it is possible to see how the term râfizî 
was used in the Ottoman Empire. Aşıkpaşazade in his account, while telling the story of 
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Cüneyd, states that because of his debate with sheik Albdullatif regarding some religious 
issues in the Konevi lodge, Cüneyd and his followers were declared kâfir by Sheik 
Abdullatif. According to Aşıkpaşazade in his letter to the bey of Karaman, sheik 
Abdüllatif stated that the aim of Cüneyd was not about sofuluk (asceticism), he violated 
sharia and dictated his own Islamic understanding. While describing the features of Shah 
Ismail’s mürîd (follower), Aşıkpaşazade states that they did not use the greetings of God 
but said shah instead of it, and that they did not pray or fast. They used the words in 
relation to rafz (belief of râfizîs), and thus they had obvious rafz. Aşıkpaşazade also 
describes cruelties that Shah Ismail did to Muslims in Tabriz and how he breached the 
Islamic laws (Aşıkpaşazade 1949, 250-252). From this it can be understood that the term 
râfizî was used to refer to the religious inclination of certain groups who were not 
considered Muslim by the Ottomans. At the same time, it is understood that these groups 
who were defined with rafz were the Kızılbaş in Anatolia and Iran. 
 
Lütfi Paşa in his account states that Ismail chose the râfizî madhab (Lütfi Paşa 2001, 194). 
Prior to the Çaldıran war, Lütfi Paşa describes Selim’s explanation for the war to his high 
state officials thus: that Shah Ismail had chosen the râfizî madhab, made it halal to kill 
Sunnis for himself and his devil followers, destroyed madrasas and masjids, and degraded 
Islam. Therefore, Selim said that he would fight with him and his army (Lütfi Paşa 2001, 
199) According to Celalzade the Safavids had rafz and ilhâd, had created a heretic 
madhab and named it Shi’i, and had spread it around and gathered adherents. He calls 
them kâfir, describes some of their actions, and says that religion orders him to fight with 
them, which is why the ulema gave a fatwa in that direction prior to Selim’s campaign 
(Celalzade 1990, 59, 129, 272-273). He also states that around Nakhchivan a city was 
destroyed because although its community looked like true Muslims, in reality they were 
not from clean a madhab but, they were râfizî and had breached the principles of the 
sharia (Celalzade 1990, 383). In all these accounts we see that while the term râfizî was 
used to assert a religious understanding of the Kızılbaş groups, at the same time the term 
was also used to refer to Kızılbaş groups i.e. adherents of the Safavids in Anatolia and the 
Safavids in Iran because in the accounts those who are defined with this religious 
understanding are Kızılbaş communities. 
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In mühimme records we see that the term râfizî was used in two ways. First, as a religious 
understanding of the Kızılbaş, to express the religious characteristics of these groups, their 
religious activities, and beliefs. The term was also used together with the terms ilhâd and 
mülhid in various forms such as “to be known for rafz and ilhâd” (râfizî ve ilhâd ile 
meşhur olub), “acting through rafz and ilhâd” (rafz u ilhâd üzere olan), and “one who is 
râfizî and mülhid” (râfizî ve mülhid olan) to emphasize their religio-legal status in the 
eyes of the state (Başaran 2019, 29-31; Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 191). Second, it was 
used to define Kızılbaş individuals and communities who supported the Safavids and 
those who engaged in subversive acts against the Ottoman state. In this respect, in the 
official documents groups and individuals who acted subversively to the general 
functioning of the state and society, and who had a different way of social and religious 
conduct, were termed Râfizî-Kızılbaş in a slanderous and humiliating way (Teber 2005, 
21-27, 29). 
 
Overall, in the Ottoman discourse and legal language the term râfizî was used as one of 
the religious umbrella terms and as a political identity primarily for the Kızılbaş and 
Kalenderî communities who were influenced by Shi’ism, and other communities who 
were considered outside the prescribed ehl-i sunnah and subversive to the Ottoman state 
authority (Teber 2005, 29; Ocak 1982, 154-156). 
 
 
2.2.2. Kızılbaş 
 
There are various opinions about the origin of the word Kızılbaş. According to one 
explanation, Ali had a red sarık (headdress specific to Muslims men) during the conquest 
of Hayber Castle and was thus called by the name of Kızılbaş. According to another, Ali 
made his soldiers wear a red sarık in the Sıffin war to separate them from Muaviyye’s 
soldiers (Üzüm 2002, 546-557; Eröz 1990, 87-88; Fığlalı 1996, 11-12). There are also 
various explanations that are not related to the history of Islam. According to one, the 
ancient Turks had headgear in various colors and a red headdress was one of them. 
Previously the Turcoman groups had worn a red one, but after they had accepted Islam, 
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they had abandoned its usage (Üzüm 2002, 546-557; Eröz 1990, 80-82; Fığlalı 1996, 9-
10). 
 
Another explanation is that the term first emerged during the time of sheik Haydar, the 
father of Shah Ismail, based on the red headgear that he and his followers wore. The 
Turcoman groups who were his followers were thus called by this name (Gündüz 2016, 
32; Melikoff 1993, 52, Dalkıran 2002, 100-101). According to another explanation, some 
groups were named after the color of the cloth they wore, and so the Safavids were called 
Kızılbaş and the Ottomans were called Akbaş (Savaş 2013, 8; Eröz 1996, 81-82; Dalkıran 
2002, 100-101). Overall, it could be said that the term Kızılbaş was used to define 
Turcoman communities or members of these communities who were members or 
follower of the Safavid monarchy and the Safavid religious order. These groups had a 
particular religious and social structure that were not contained within the political and 
religious boundaries established by the Ottoman state.  
 
The Ottoman state and historians have used the term Kızılbaş as a common name for all 
the Turkish groups that supported Shah Ismail and the Safavids starting from period of 
Sheik Haydar. In the beginning the term did not contain any humiliating meaning. While 
initially the term referred to the affiliation of these communities to the Safeviyye order 
and the Safavids, later on with the emergence of the Safavid Empire and Safavid 
propaganda it also gained meanings that referred to the particular religious beliefs and 
political actions of these communities, not solely in Anatolia but also in other territories 
that the Ottoman controlled. The term was also used for the Safavid Empire and its 
subjects. The Safavids also defined themselves as Kızılbaş (Teber 2005, 32-33; Onat 
2003, 111, 113; Ocak 2000, 133, 150; Uluerler 2014, 27-33). 
 
Through the course of events between the Ottomans and the Safavids it is possible to see 
how adherents of the Safavids in Anatolia and the Safavids in Iran were named and 
identified in fifteenth and sixteenth century Ottoman historiography. By looking the 
following examples from several accounts, it can be said that groups who supported Shah 
Ismail and the Safavids were called by various names but were mostly called Kızılbaş. 
Aşıkpaşazade, as an early example, names these groups as Erdebil sofuları (ascetics), and 
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mürîds (followers) of Cüneyd in his Tevârih. According to his account, the mürîds of 
Cüneyd also became mürîds of Haydar when he was still an infant. After that they became 
mürîds of Ismail, son of Haydar. He also states that Bayezid II exiled the disciples 
(individuals that were sent to Anatolia by the Safavids for propaganda and to rally 
supporters) of sofu and sofus who went to Erdebil, from Anatolia to Rumeli 
(Aşıkpaşazade 1949, 250-251). In a mühimme record dated 1501 they were called sufi 
and the sufi followers of Erdebiloğlu. This record relates to the capture of sufis and 
disciples who ran away to Erdebil’s side (Zarinebaf Shahr 1997, 6). Although practical 
measures were taken, like putting men on the borders and preventing migration to Iran, it 
can be said that the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire 
was not so tense compared to later periods. Until Bayezid II, official financial help was 
sent to the Safeviyye order annually under the name of çerâğ akçesi (Babinger and 
Köprülü 1996, 19). This help later continued from time to time (Baltacıoğlu 2014, 32). 
Sümer states that Shah Ismail called Bayezid II “father” in his letters and in one of them 
asked him not to prevent visits from members of the order. Bayezid II answered that he 
would not apply this ban to those who promised to return after their visit, since otherwise 
it would cause him tax problems. Also, Bayezid II let Shah Ismail and his army pass 
through Ottoman lands to go to Dulkadir lands (Sümer 1976, 25-26, 29). Therefore, it can 
be said that both the Ottomans and the Safavids were cautious about each other and tried 
not to create obvious tension or enmity at this period. 
 
By the time of the Şah Kulu rebellion, Safavid propaganda and movements into Ottoman 
lands, coupled with Selim’s aggressive policies against the Safavids, the perception and 
identification of their adherents in Anatolia had changed and the term Kızılbaş had begun 
to be applied. In the anonymous Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman that ends with the enthronement of 
Selim, Şah Kulu and his followers are defined as Kızılbaş and it is stated that many 
Kızılbaş migrated to Tabriz as a result of this rebellion. Also, in this account it is stated 
that the Kızılbaş caused fesâd, insulted the four caliphs, and killed many people (Anonim 
Osmanlı Kroniği 2000, 139-141). In the anonymous Tevârih of Giese edition, the author 
states that Şah Kulu, to whom Bayezid II sent annual financial help, was in fact a Kızılbaş. 
He rebelled and his hidden Kızılbaş followers and coreligionists joined to him. They 
plundered places, caused many fesâd, and insulted the four caliphs. This account also says 
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that many Kızılbaş ran to the Acem side and to Tabriz after the rebellion was suppressed 
(Anonim Tevarih-i Al-i Osman 1992, 132-133). In this account the name Kızılbaş is used 
for the Safavids and their soldiers in the narration of Selim’s Çaldıran war (Anonim 
Tevarih-i Al-i Osman 1992, 136). In the account it is sated that the Acem people had a 
heretical madhab, insulted the four caliphs and the prophet, and that they were an azgın 
tâife (disorderly community). According to the account it was for these reasons that 
Suleyman decided to advance towards them (Anonim Tevarih-i Al-i Osman 1992, 143). 
 
Şükri-i Bitlisi also defines these groups and the Safavids as Kızılbaş, evbâş (rabble), 
sürhser (Kızılbaş in Persian), Kızılbaş-ı şâki (bad Kızılbaş), and Kızılbaş-ı gümrâh 
(Kızılbaş who lost his path) and he uses the name Erdebiloğlu for Shah Ismail in addition 
to the word shah while describing Selim’s Çaldıran campaign and other confrontations 
with the Safavid Empire when he was a prince in Trabzon (Şükri-i Bitlisi 1995, 29, 30-
31, 64, 184, 186, 189, 220, 250). Lütfi Paşa in his account describes the coming of Shah 
Ismail to Erzincan and his collection of many followers there. He defines Shah Ismail’s 
followers as müfsid-i bi-din (unbeliever seditious people), mülhid-i zındîk (heretic 
apostates), and Kızılbaş while describing his rebellion (Lütfi Paşa 2001, 193-194). He 
says that Bayezid II asked Selim to take revenge for the ehl-i Islam on the Kızılbaş and 
of the Ottomans from Egypt as a last wish while leaving his throne to his son (Lütfi Paşa 
2001, 196). By this it can be said that in addition to their adherents in Anatolia, the 
Safavids were called Kızılbaş by the Ottomans. According to Lütfi Paşa in his letter to 
Shah Tahmasp before advancing towards him Suleyman accused him of gathering various 
etrâk (Turks) and evbâş (rabble) and causing fisk u fücr (immorality) and tahrîb-i bilâd 
(damaging countries) (Lütfi Paşa 2001, 274). Lütfi Paşa calls the adherent of the Safavids 
Kızılbaş, Shah Ismail’s etbâ (followers of Shah Ismail), bi-din mezhebsiz-i etbâ 
(unbeliever followers of the person who has no madhab), mürîd (follower), bi-din 
melâhide (unbeliever heretics), Kızılbaş-ı bed ma’aş (Kızılbaş who has evil life), and bi-
had halk (community who does not know limits) while narrating the Çaldıran campaign 
of Selim and the Iran campaigns of Suleyman (Lütfi Paşa 2001, 69, 82, 87, 205-207, 213-
214, 218, 221, 253, 291). He also uses names like Erdebiloğlu, şah-ı bi-din (unbeliever 
shah), şah-ı bed râh (shah in the wrong path), şah-ı gümrâh (shah who lost his way), 
asâkir-i şeyâtin (soldiers of devils), sürhser, and Kızılbaş-ı şâki (evil Kızılbaş) for the 
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Safavid rulers and their soldiers (Lütfi Paşa 2001, 199, 205, 208-209, 212-214, 221, 253, 
272, 291, 309).  
 
Kemalpaşazade calls Shah Ismail bed-nihâd (wicked natured) and müfsid-i mülhid 
(apostate seditious) while describing his rebellion and states that he gathered many people 
around himself. Kemalpaşazade says that because many parts of Anatolia were full of his 
hulefây-ı bed ray (ill-minded disciples) Ismail hoped to gather many Kızılbaş-ı vesair 
evbâş (Kızılbaş and other rabble) around himself while waiting on the border before going 
over Dulkadiroğlu. While describing the Şah Kulu rebellion he defines Ismail as gümrâh 
(one who has lost his path) and states that by sending his men to hulefâ (disciples) and 
ehibbâ (friends) in Anatolia he caused a revolt among the Kızılbaş people (Sümer 1996, 
27-29). He says that Ismail tortured and killed many Sunni Muslim and ulema, filled cities 
with bid’at (bad innovation), zındîka (heresy), and dalâlet-i zulmet (heretic darkness). He 
says that Ismail went on a path of heresy, invited people to heresy publicly, and spread 
the unfounded heretic madhab of Shi’ism and that the common people believed this 
(Dalkıran 2002, 70-73). 
 
Celalzade Mustafa in his Selim-nâme defines Shah Ismail and his followers in Anatolia 
and Iran as Kızılbaş, tâife-i Kızılbaş (Kızılbaş community), etbâ-ı evbâş (follower of the 
rabble), etrâk-ı bi-idrâk (unintelligent Turks), and Kızılbaş-ı evbâş (Kızılbaş of rabble). 
He states that Ismail should have followed the right path, but he went to the path of heresy 
and some bi-idrâk Turks followed him (Celalzade 1990, 59, 148, 150, 162, 129, 272-273). 
According to this account, Selim stated that many people had an inclination to the tâife-i 
Kızılbaş and asked the administrators of various provinces to refrain people who had this 
inclination towards the Kızılbaş and the Kızılbaş Cânib in Anatolia from having 
inclination towards the Kızılbaş (Celalzade 1990, 61). 
 
Hence, it can be said that in the Ottoman sources Kızılbaş meant those groups or 
individuals who supported the Safavids, disrupted order, harmed Sunni Muslims and the 
Ottoman state, and followed and obeyed the Safavid shah or his disciples, as well as those 
who were considered apostate or heretical, or who followed a heretic path or madhab. 
Similarly, in the mühimme records from the sixteenth century we see that the word 
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Kızılbaş was used with two meanings. First, as the name of every community or 
individual who had a political relationship with Iran, who were considered to be in 
opposition by the political authority; and second as the name of groups of religious origin 
and movements that disrupted the social peace and behaved contrary to public morals. 
They were named Kızılbaş because of their opposition to religious and social values 
(Dalkıran 2002, 73; Başaran 2019, 14-15; Şener and Hazerfen 2002, 191). 
 
Therefore, in parallel with the unfolding events that occurred within the Ottoman Empire 
and between it and the Safavid Empire, the slow evolution in the definition of certain 
Turkish groups from mürîd to Kızılbaş and other negative religious and socio-political 
names such as unbeliever, wicked, and unintelligent can be traced in the Ottoman sources. 
By looking the Ottoman sources and the course of events, it can be said that certain 
Turkish groups who were followers of the Erdebil lodge became known as Kızılbaş when 
they evolved from mere mürîds to active contributors to the Safavid Empire’s political 
aims of sovereignty in the process of the emergence of the Safavid Empire; and when the 
Safavid religio-political activities and aspirations in Ottoman lands, described in various 
Ottoman chronicles, became dangerous for Ottoman state security and the wellbeing of 
the Sunni Muslim community. Other factors contributing to this process include Sarıgörez 
Hamza’s fatwa identifying the Kızılbaş and the Safavids as kâfir and mülhid, thus 
justifying war and their severe persecution during the reign of Selim I; the Safavids’ 
increasing political threat to the Ottoman existence; both parties’ political aims and 
religious discourses; Selim’s self-attributed role as the protector of Sunni Islam that was 
continued by Suleyman; and the messianic and imperialistic discourses of the time among 
the large empires. Thus, the term Kızılbaş gained stronger religious and political 
connotations when the struggle between the two sides intensified. The term Kızılbaş 
started to denote opposition against Sunni Islam and subversion against the state, and was 
associated with rebels, apostates, and heretics as an identifying, humiliating, and 
slanderous word like the word râfizî in the Ottoman discourse and legal usage (Onat 2003, 
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121-123; Teber 2005, 32-33; Ocak 2000, 133, 150; Uluerler 2014, 32; Teber 2007, 29-
30, 36; Üzüm 2002, 547).11  
 
 
2.3. Ottoman Şeyhülislâms’ Practical Measures towards Kızılbaş Individuals 
and Groups 
 
 
As the Ottoman şeyhülislâms’ religio-legal identification of Kızılbaş groups differed from 
oneanother in certain regards, the practical measures that they advocated against them 
also differed. Their opinions about what could and could not be done against these groups 
defined the constraints and the legal and socially accepted elbowroom for the Ottoman 
state in dealing with the Kızılbaş issue. The Ottoman state developed its policies vis-à-
vis these groups based on these opinions in the war against the Safavids and the 
punishment of their adherents. 
 
Sarıgörez’s interpretation of Sunni doctrine made it mandatory in his eyes to fight against 
the Safavids and their supporters. Also, his explanation legitimizes many kinds of harsh 
measures against them, including the execution of men and the enslavement of women 
and children. They were to lose the right of any legal status, their marriages and previous 
legal acts were to be invalidated, and they were not to receive inheritance. According to 
him, the Kızılbaş threatened the foundations of the Islamic community hence it was vacib 
and farz (necessary and compulsory) for all Muslims to fight them. In this opinion he 
does not make any differentiation between Safavids in Safavid lands and in Ottoman lands 
but considers the Kızılbaş group as a whole. In Sarıgörez’s interpretation since they had 
heretical beliefs and recognized Shah Ismail, followers of the Safavids who were Ottoman 
 
 
 
11 Müslümanlar. Bilün ve âgâh olun. Şol tâife-i Kızılbaş ki, reisleri Erdebiloğlu İsmaildir..” Mevlana Sarı Görez 
Nureddin Hamza’s fatwa in Tekindağ 1967,54-55. 
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subject were the enemy of the empire and were guilty as much as others and equally 
subject to the harshest punishment, without exception (Atçıl 2017, 300-301). 
 
Kemalpaşazade, unlike Sarıgörez, distinguishes between Safavids outside of the Ottoman 
Empire and their supporters within the Ottoman lands. Kemalpaşazade does not make an 
explicit statement regarding whether the Ottoman authorities had the right to capture and 
castigate individuals associated with the Safavids. “However, his treatise, which contains 
supporting excerpts from Hanafi jurisprudential works, indicates that the state could 
capture and castigate individuals associated with the Safavids and their belief.” (Atçıl 
2017, 303-304). He prescribes the same treatment as Sarıgörez for apostate unbelievers: 
their marriages are invalid, their children are illegitimate, their land is dar-ul harb (land 
of war), and hence it is vacib for the sultan to fight against them, and it is farz for every 
Muslim to provide support for that effort. However, he gives protection to Safavid 
supporters who are in Ottoman lands. According to his approach, the land of the adherents 
of the Safavids in Ottoman Empire can become a dar-ul harb and thus permissible for 
plunder by the Muslims only if they secede from Ottoman control and establish their own 
control in their cities. Therefore, as long as the Ottoman state has control over the region 
it has no legal right to assault Safavid supporters in its lands (Atçıl 2017, 303-304). 
 
Ebusuud in this respect, adopts a similar approach to that of Kemalpaşazade. He gives 
priority to the sultanic decisions on critical issues, while at the same time recommends a 
lenient treatment towards former supporters of the Safavids who show willingness to 
conform to Sunni society. According to him, fighting with them is mubah (merely 
permissible) and it is bound to the command of the sultan. Unlike Sarıgörez and 
Kemalpaşazade, he does not describe the penalties that could be given to this group, but 
in his treatment of enslavement he does not legitimize the enslavement of women and 
children from this group (Atçıl 2017, 306-308). 
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3. CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 
 
3.1. Criminal Law in Islam 
 
 
Islamic law, upon which Ottoman law was mainly based, does not have a separate section 
or single category for crimes and criminals in the modern legal sense (Akbulut 2003, 167; 
Hallaq 2009, 308). The part of the sharia that deals with various offences consists of 
interpretations of religious scholars based on the Quran, hadith, and sunnah, and the 
consensus of the first generation of Islamic scholars who determined what the law should 
be (Peters 2005, 1). 
 
Most Islamic law scholars evaluate the offences in three distinct categories as hadd, kısas, 
and tazîr offences (Hallaq 2009, 310-311; Peters 2005, 6-7; Uslu 1998, 36, 45-50; 
Akgündüz 1999, 1; Cammack 2012, 2; Keskioğlu 1969, 286). There are also some 
scholars who evaluate criminal law in two categories: hadd and tazîr (Maydani 1964, 64; 
Çalışkan 1990, 272-273). Groupings are made according to how scholars define these 
offences. The former group makes the categorization on the basis of whether offences are 
considered a violation of the claims of God (hadd), claims of individuals/worshippers 
(kısas) or both (tazîr). The latter group divides into hadd offences and tazîr offences 
according to whether the definition and the punishment (amount/kind) of the offences are 
prescribed and fixed in the Quran or hadith or not. Offences in some works are described 
in both ways so these two definitions are not mutually exclusive (Akbulut 2003, 167-168; 
Uslu 1998, 36, 45-50). 
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Islamic law gives a certain scope to the ruler to define and determine laws in the name of 
preserving public security, order, and morality. Ottoman rulers were able to inject their 
own administrative laws to the criminal law. Sultanic law might be separated from the 
sharia in some aspects but it was legitimized and permitted by the religious law itself to 
a certain extent. Within the scope of this work and in relation to our topic, kısas and diya 
as the punishments for homicide and bodily harm are not our area of interest. For our 
purpose, we will be looking only at hadd and tazîr offences and punishments.  
 
Hadd offences are described as God’s claims and are regulated with fixed penalties in the 
Quran or hadith (Peters 2005, 53; Lange 2008, 20; Akgündüz 1999, 2; Cammack 2012, 
2; Keskioğlu 1969, 286; Akbulut 2003, 168; Çalışkan 1990, 374). It is not straightforward 
to punish an offence as a hadd offence and to apply a prescribed hadd punishment because 
hadd punishments are mostly capital punishments or severe corporal punishments such 
as amputation, execution, severe beating, or death by stoning. The verification of an 
offence can be done only with a confession or the testimonies of eyewitnesses. No other 
type of witnessing, including that of the victim, or an oath is valid in the hadd accusations 
and their verification. Any kind of doubt, or withdrawal of the confession or testimony 
makes a hadd accusation null. The good character or the social standing of the accused 
person is not taken into consideration in hadd offences. Circumstantial evidence cannot 
be used. They cannot be pardoned, and their punishment cannot be changed, decreased, 
or increased by any authority. However, repentance is effective in the quashing of hadd 
punishments (Uslu 1998, 77-80; Çalışkan 1990, 376; Peters 2005, 11-20, 27, 66-67, 
Schacht 175-187; Cammack 2012, 3-4; Pate and Gould 2012, 45-46; Keskioğlu 1969, 
286; Ansay 2002, 316-317; Schacht 1982, 175-176). 
 
Although there are some disagreements about which offences fall into the category of 
hadd offences, all madhabs consider theft, highway robbery, adultery, unfounded 
accusation of adultery, and alcohol consumption to be hadd offences (Schacht 1982; 178-
181; Uslu 1998, 37-38; Cammack 2012, 3; Pate and Gould 2012, 46; Keskioğlu 1969, 
286; Ansay 2002, 316-329). Besides these, Hanafi scholars also consider apostasy as a 
hadd offence (Peters 2005, 53; Akgündüz 1999, 2-3). When an offence cannot be 
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prosecuted as a hadd offence due to lack of evidence or procedural problems, the accused 
is subjected to a tazîr punishment.  
 
Tazîr is a category for those offences in which the content and amount of punishments 
are not prescribed in the Quran or hadith and are left to the head of state or the political 
authority to determine. Tazîr, also known as discretionary punishment, encompasses three 
different kinds of punishments: a) punishments for offences described in the Quran 
without specific punishments; b) punishments that are given for hadd offences in case of 
lack of evidence or as an additional punishment to a hadd punishment; c) punishment of 
the offences or acts which are determined and seen as a threat to public security and order 
(it is up to the ruler to determine which actions threaten state security and public order 
and hence should be considered an offence) (Akgündüz 1999, 8; Çalışkan 1990, 375; 
Maydani 1960, 68; Cammack 2012, 5-6; Keskioğlu 1969, 297-298; Pate and Gould 2012, 
47-48). Thus, the scope of tazîr is extremely broad. It ranges from sodomy to 
embezzlement and the refusal to perform religious duties such as daily prayer or fasting 
(Peters 2005, 66). In contrast to hadd offences and penalties, those for tazîr are more 
flexible and they can be pardoned. Tazîr punishments include flogging, imprisonment, 
exile, fines, deposition, being scorned in public, scolding, and warning in court. Also, 
more than one tazîr punishment can be applied for a single offence (Akgündüz 1999, 8-
9; Cammack 2012, 6-7; Pate and Gould 2012, 48). 
 
 
3.2. Ottoman Criminal Law 
 
 
Besides Islamic law, there was also kânûn law in the Ottoman legal system. Scholars have 
different points of view regarding the relationship between Islamic law and kânûn. The 
first group argues that although theoretically it was supposed to complement the sharia 
and be harmonious with it, there were many articles and laws that contradicted the sharia 
or even went against it (Heyd 1969, 633-634, 641-645; Imber 2006, 317; Barkan 1946, 
19, 42-45; Üçok 1946, 125-126). According to the second group, Ottoman law consisted 
solely of sharia law. Only a small portion was established and regulated by the political 
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authority and it was done within the limit and scope that the sharia legally and legitimately 
granted to the political authority in the area of administrative law. It was meant to 
complement the sharia and give the authority the discretionary means to provide public 
order and security (Aydın 1993, 478; Akgündüz 1999, 5; Yurtseven and Şahin 2016, 166-
170; Peters 2005, 71-75; Gerber 1994, 61-64). The third group defines the relationship 
by defining the borders between the two parts of the law. According to this approach the 
Ottoman rulers saw themselves as rule makers and the absolute authority, and so created 
public rules based on the tradition and örf (custom). As the absolute authority and law 
maker of customary law they made rules side by side with sharia (Mumcu 1963, 40-42; 
İnalcık 2000, 41-45; Acar 2001, 54-57; Jennings 1979, 164; Benton 2002, 104-105). 
 
 Regardless of the differences in their understanding of this relationship, all scholars 
recognize the kânûn. As a major element of Ottoman law, kânûn was an “enacted written 
law” (İnalcık 2000, 27, 31-33, 40-41; Barkan 1946, 20-2) that was established by the ruler 
based on society’s needs and traditions. Kânûns could consist of a single article or set of 
articles regarding a single or different topics, and they were either to be applied 
throughout the empire or to be restricted to a certain region or a certain community. 
Kânûn covered public law, tax law, criminal law, and administrative law. It was a crucial 
component of Ottoman law because it was established for dealing with offences and 
punishments that were left undetailed by the sharia (Barkan 1946, 20-2; İnalcık 2000, 27, 
31-33, 40-41).  
 
Regulations issued by the state were crucial in providing justice. In the Ottoman Empire 
besides the application and preservation of Islamic ethical principles, providing and 
preserving “the circle of justice” (Darling 2008, 505-531) were also very important. There 
were two traditions on which the Ottoman understanding of justice was established. The 
first was the tradition of the circle of justice inherited from the Seljuks and the Ilkhanids, 
which formed the legal philosophy of the Ottoman law codes, and the second was the 
tradition of Islamic ethical principles regarding morality, equality, and social justice that 
evolved from the Quran, hadith, and sharia (Darling 2008, 505-531; İnalcık 2000, 49-55, 
75-80; Zarinebaf 2011, 22-23).  
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The first criminal legislation was enacted by Mehmed II, and revised and extended by 
Bayezid II. Mehmet II’s teşkilât kânûnnâme had only one article on criminal law 
(fratricide), while his second kânûn contained military, criminal, and administrative laws 
which were taken as the basis for impending kânûns ones and had criminal law in its first 
part in three articles regarding the regulations of tazîr. These kânûns were referred as 
Kânûn-i Âl-i Osman. Bayezid II’s kânûn was almost the same as his father’s, with the 
first three articles about criminal law, specifically the regulations of tazîr punishment. 
The public kânûnnâmes of Suleyman that contained the previous legislations with 
additions remained in force until the end of seventeenth century with minor changes and 
adaptations. The first part of the first general kânûnnâme of Suleyman (1520) was 
arranged in four sections about criminal law. In the second general kânûnnâme (1566), 
these articles and others were expanded and systematized (Akgündüz 1999, 12-13; Heyd 
1969, 636-637; Acar 2001, 57, 59, 62-63; Imber 2006, 323-325; Schacht 1982, 90-91).  
 
Overall, only a small portion of the Kânûn-i Âl-i Osman was about criminal law. The 
Ottoman criminal code consisted of rules for judicial procedure and the duties of the kadıs 
and executive officials in the judicial system. The vast majority of the criminal law section 
of the Kânûn-i Âl-i Osman however dealt with the substantive penal law. It defined 
punishable offences and referred to their penalties. However, the code did not list a 
punishment for each offence, but rather gave indirect references to the type of penalty 
incurred. Offences not mentioned in the criminal code could still be punished at the 
discretion of the kadı or the executive officials by tazîr or siyâsa (Peters 2005, 72-74; 
Heyd 1973, 178).  
 
The Ottoman criminal code had two main categories of punishment:  grand offences 
(cürm-ü gâliz) that necessitated capital or severe corporal punishments (siyâsa), and 
others that required chastisement (tazîr) or fine. Petty crimes were within the latter 
category for which the sharia gives tazîr as a punishment (Heyd 1973; 259). 
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3.2.1. Siyâsa and Tazîr Punishments in the Context of Ottoman Penal Law  
 
The term siyâsâ in Islamic legal parlance means administrative justice (Gerber 1994, 80, 
100, 170). In relation to administrative justice it was both governance and punishment 
(Lange 2008, 14; Peirce 2003, 312-314; Schacht 1982, 54). It referred to the area of 
actions, regulations, and jurisdictions about security, taxation, and other issues, that the 
ruler established and regulated through an independent legislation as he saw fit to protect 
order and security in a broader sense (Schacht 1977, 64; Mumcu 1963, 43-49; Katgı 2013, 
182-183; Yurtseven and Şahin 2016, 184, 196-197). Siyâset was recognized within the 
limit of sharia by Islamic scholars because in order to be effective sharia requires the 
executive arm of the state. Also, it was seen necessary for the preservation and application 
of law and order with the principles of sharia (Schacht 1982, 54; Peirce 2003, 312-314). 
While it included the preservation and application of the sharia and was recognized by it, 
siyâsa contained all the administrative law, criminal law, legal enforcements, and justice 
that were established by the ruler and his representatives for the sake of the public good 
(Schacht 1977, 64; Mumcu 1963, 43-49; Katgı 2013, 182-183; Yurtseven and Şahin 2016, 
184, 196-197). 
 
In the Ottoman legal penal language siyâset meant punishment in the wider sense. All 
kinds of administrative punishments could be called siyâset, including monetary ones 
(Peirce 2003, 304). Hadd punishments were also called siyâset because their application 
was the duty of the state (Akgündüz 1999, 8-9). However, in technical terms it usually 
referred either to the death penalty or to severe corporal punishments like amputation 
(Heyd 1973, 260; Schacht 1977, 64; Mumcu 1963, 43-49; Katgı 2013, 182-183). The 
state could execute all kinds of disruptors who threatened social security, peace, and 
justice, although they might be subjected to lesser punishment under sharia as in the case 
of habitual thieves) (Peirce 2003, 312-314). Execution by the decision of the ruler was 
named siyâseten katl (execution by siyâsa) or tazîr-i bil katl (execution by tâzir) 
(Yurtseven and Şahin 2016, 184, 196-197). It was justified by Islamic jurisprudence as 
an addition to tazîr punishments but it was not completely restricted by the sharia and 
could also be imposed directly without being subjected to Islamic judicial procedure in 
the case of punishment of state officials (Peirce 2003, 312-314; Yurtsseven and Şahin 
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2016, 196-197; Koç and Tuğluca 2006, 20; Akgündüz 1999, 8-10). Thus Siyâseten 
indicated punishment either for offences which could not be proven in accordance with 
the sharia's strict rules of criminal procedure, or for offences not covered by the sharia, 
(Heyd 1973, 192-193, 199; Ergene 2003, 159) as well as for the administrative 
punishments that are not stated in the sharia (in the strict sense) and that are born out of 
the necessity of preserving the public wellbeing, order, and justice, that is, administrative 
offences and public offences (Heyd 1973, 260; Peters 2005, 68; Gerber 1994, 80, 100; 
Peirce 2003, 312-314; Ergene 2003, 159-160). So siyâsâ punishments could be enforced 
for social order, or because religion required it. 
 
Orders that were established by the administrative authority were called siyâset-i şeriyye, 
kavânin-i siyâset, or kânûn (Yurtseven and Şahin 2016, 166-167; Schacht 1982, 54; 
Akgündüz 1999, 8-9; Heyd 1969, 198-200). The kânûns that regulated execution and 
severe corporal punishments were also called siyâsetname and were in fact independent 
kânûnnames and separate from other criminal kânûnnames that regulated tazîr 
(discretionary) punishments and fines. By the addition of siyâsetname to the criminal law 
of Mehmet II, the criminal law code (ceza kânûnnamesi) that composed the first part of 
the Kânûn-i Âl-i Osman emerged (Heyd 1969, 636; Barkan 1946, 25). However, the 
criminal code did not list all the offences that could be classified as siyâseten and their 
penalties, which could be found in individual fermâns or other administrative/legal 
documents. The penalties could either be given through religious law, like amputation, or 
by the kânûn, such as castration (Heyd 1973, 260). 
 
While siyâset had more than one meaning and some of them were not defined or were 
related to punishment as mentioned above, tazîr also referred to various kinds of offences 
and punishments. Tazîr meant discretionary punishment by the order of the ruler 
including execution (tazîren katl), but in Ottoman legal usage it referred to corporal 
beating or stroke. The term tazîr-bi’l-darb (stroke by bastinado, lash, stick, or scourge) 
was especially used to separate it from other tazîrs such as tazîr-i bi’l-mal (fines), and 
tazîr-i bi’l teşhîr (being scorned in public) (Heyd 1973, 271-273; Akgündüz 1999, 8-10; 
Koç and Tuğluca 2006, 20; Yurtseven and Şahin 2016, 184, 196-197; Schatch 1982, 175). 
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3.3. Ottoman Judicial Procedure and Agents 
 
 
3.3.1. Judiciary Officials, Kadıs and Executive Officials, and Ehl-i Örf  
 
Judiciary officials, kadıs and their personnel were the main group of officials in the 
Ottoman judicial system. Kadıs were the head of districts (kazâ) as civil and judicial 
administrators. Their main duty was to judge civil and criminal cases, but they were also 
responsible for various tasks typical of municipal governors. Kadıs were responsible for 
the investigation of all allegations, establishing facts, and the suspect’s innocence or guilt 
and consequently the verdict (Heyd 1973, 217; Peters 2005, 81; Zarinebaf 2011, 10; 
Ergene 2003, 50, 104). Kadıs were also itinerant, as they or more commonly their naib 
(deputy) travelled around the kazâ to oversee cases and complaints. However, there were 
other ways to solve problems other than applying to the court or other legal authorities 
and sometimes kadıs were used simply as an official scribe by people to apply higher 
authorities such as the great divan or governor, mostly regarding the oppression and 
injustice of state officials (İnalcık 2001, 336; Ergene 2003, 47-48, 50-51, 104, 170-180; 
Schacht 1982, 188-189; Akdağ 1979, 94-99, 102-103; Jennings 1979, 151-152, 163-164; 
Yurtseven and Şahin 2016, 170-174, 187-189; Gerber 1994, 63; Jennings 1978, 141-142, 
149; Coşgel and Ergene 2016; 65-68; Schacht 1982; 90-92; Peirce 2003, 7, 9, 89-91; 
Akdağ 1995, 88-91). 
 
Except for certain military matters, the functioning of all state institutions was under the 
surveillance and supervision of the kadıs. They were responsible for the functioning of 
the state on the district level, the enforcement of orders that were sent to the kazâ, and the 
overseeing of criminal and civil cases according to şer-i şerif, kânûn-ı münif, and local 
traditions (İnalcık 2001, 336; Akdağ 1955, 49-50; Akdağ 1979, 94-99, 102-103; 
Akgündüz 2010, 241-242; Jennings 1979, 151-152, 163-164; Yurtseven and Şahin 2016, 
170-174, 187-189; Gerber 1994, 63; Zarinebaf 2011, 18-19; Schacht 1982, 90-92, 188-
189; Jennings 1978, 141-142, 149; Ergene 2003, 23-25, 27; Coşgel and Ergene 2016; 65-
68; Peirce 2003, 7, 9, 89-91; Akdağ 1995, 88-91). 
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There were other personnel in the court who helped the kadı in various tasks. Other than 
naibs as mentioned above there were muhzırs who were responsible for bringing people 
to the court in cases that were not criminal or murder cases. They were appointed by the 
court and responsible to it. They could go alone or with a plaintiff, a group of Muslims, 
or both to summon a defendant to the court. Muhzır had no authority to use force and so 
could not force a defendant to come to court, and the defendant could accept and then 
ignore the summon or refuse it completely. Muhzırs could not initiate a case officially, 
unlike subaşıs (chief of law enforcement authority). They could also be sent for errands 
by the court (Jennings 1978, 151-165; Ergene 2003, 25; Akdağ 1979, 100-102; Peirce 
2003, 96). The duty of the scribes in the court was to record the court’s operation, to keep 
and maintain these records, and to prepare a copy of these records and legal administrative 
documents for clients. They could also leave the court and listen to disputes, 
independently of naibs, and could serve as naib (Coşgel and Ergene 2016, 9; Peirce 2003, 
96).  
 
Mufti supplied the case with legal opinions. This was not an official duty and the mufti 
did not defend his fatwa in court. Fatwa was not brought to the proceeding before all sides 
of the suit i.e. defense and witnesses were called to the court. The fatwa was considered 
only if there were no witnesses. The kadı was supposed to consider the fatwa in relation 
to the case as a component after he checked the relevance of its content with the present 
case but he by no means had to decide in favor of the fatwa’s opinion as fatwas had no 
legal binding in judiciary cases (Gerber 1994, 79-80; Akdağ 1955,48-49; Jennings 1979, 
157, 176; Zarinebaf 2011, 19; Ergene 2003, 30-31, 150; Schacht 1982, 74; Peirce 2003, 
114-115). The kadı could refuse the fatwa of a mufti for a case, especially when both 
sides brought fatwas in their favor (Heyd 1969, 51-56). It was the same with the order 
that was brought to the court for a certain case. The order was an impersonal statement of 
the kânûn and again it was up to kadı to decide whether the case conformed to a general 
order. The plaintiff had to accept his verdict (Jennings 1979, 154, 176).  
 
They were also people from the community (müşahid/şuhüd-ül hal) in the court to witness 
and observe the cases. There was not a standard cadre for şuhüd-ül hal. Every Muslim 
male member of the community who was mentally healthy and had a good reputation in 
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society could become a şuhüd-ül hal. Ehl-i örf could become a şuhüd-ül hal when the 
case was a major criminal case. They were the sign that the case was overseen objectively, 
acting in a sense like a jury. They were consulted about the local customs of the region 
and the reputation of the people who came to the court. In terms of the legal proceeding’s 
validity their existence was essential. They put their signature to the hüccet that was 
recorded in the şeriyye sicil (court registers) beneath the summary of the case (Heyd 1973, 
217-218, 266; Akdağ 1955, 49-51; Akdağ 1979, 100, 102-103). 
 
The other group in the Ottoman judicial system was ehl-i örf, the executive officials who 
were responsible for ensuring public order and security, the application of punishments, 
and the investigation and seizure of the suspects and the accused. Beylerbey, sancakbey, 
subaşı, and asesbaşı were the main executive officials (Heyd 1973, 210, 219-220, 266; 
Peters 2005, 78).  
 
The duty of subaşı (chief of day police), asesbaşı (chief of night police) and the ases and 
sekban (used in place of ases after the fifteenth century) under them, besides preserving 
security, was to collect fines in the offence and murder cases and send it to the state 
treasury. Although they were appointed by the sancakbey they were under the command 
of the kadı who was also the head of security. They were considered the helpers of the 
kadı (Akdağ 1955, 50; Akdağ 1995, 88, 90) The subaşı and sancakbey were also 
prosecutors, so they inspected suspects, brought them to the court in case of an offence 
or murder, and enforced siyâset (execution) punishments (Akdağ 1979, 93, 100; 
Zarinebaf 2011, 10-12; Jennings 1978, 149; Savaş 2018, 48; Imber 1979, 266-268; Akdağ 
1995, 88). 
 
The çavuşbaşı, formally head of the imperial messengers, was another law officer. 
Besides supervising the chiefs of the day and night police, he and the çavuşes under him 
also brought the defendant to court and enforced the fines and corporal punishment 
decisions of the courts and great divan (Zarinebaf 2011, 12). For the execution of an order 
that came from the Porte, the Porte sent a mübaşir or a çavuş from that district who was 
appointed to that case to help the kadı act (Akdağ 1955, 50; Imber 1979, 263 264). The 
muhtesib (market police) was another official. He could also investigate suspects and 
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bring them to the court for various charges and enforce a punishment such as flogging 
like subaşı (Gerber 1994, 69, 71; Jennings 1978, 149, 154, 158-159).  
 
 
3.3.2 Judicial Procedure  
 
There were several ways to start a judicial process. The authorities (a police commander 
or a kadı) had to be notified about the offence by the victim, a witness, or an heir of the 
victim who came to court and made a complaint regarding a civil or criminal offense. 
Also, a petition by the victim could be given to the sultan or to a governor who would 
direct a police officer or a kadı to investigate the issue (Heyd 1973, 241; Jennings 1979, 
152, 171; Zarinebaf 2011, 6, 23-24; Jennings 1978, 149). In victimless offences like 
violation of public morality, a complaint could be sent by a police officer or an asesbaşı 
(Heyd 1973, 241-242; Peters 2005, 79-80; Zarinebaf 2011, 6; Jennings 1978, 149, 165). 
A police officer could arrest a criminal and bring them to the court with witnesses for a 
trial and sentence (Zarinebaf 2011, 20). If a police officer or a muhtesip caught a suspect 
in the act they could punish the offender on the spot without a complaint (Heyd 1973, 
236; Peters 2005, 80). 
 
The kadı was given complete control of the legal procedure by the state, and it was always 
done according to sharia (Jennings 1979, 152, 166). The trial started once the plaintiff, 
offender, and witnesses were present in the court which was named as meclis-i şer or 
mahfil-i şer or in the hands of the executive such as subaşı (Heyd 1973, 243; Peters 2005, 
81). The two sides of the case came to court willingly or they were brought by force 
(Jennings 1979, 177). The trial was open to anybody and the şuhüd-ül hal was present in 
each case (Akdağ 1979, 102-103). The process continued depending on the suspect’s 
reputation, and the available evidence (Heyd 1973, 243; Peters 2005, 81; Yurseven and 
Şahin 2016, 173). Criminal cases were often seen in the presence of a subaşı (Jennings 
1978, 166). 
 
First, the kadı investigated the case (Peters 2005, 74-75; Scathch 1977, 90; Heyd 1973, 
208; Jennings 1979, 153), which included collecting and considering the evidence, 
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conducting an investigation of crime evidence, and establishing the truthfulness of the 
witnesses and their testimonies (Peters 2005, 81; Heyd 1973, 244-245). After the 
statement of the complaint, the defendant was asked to state their innocence or guilt. Thus, 
the defendant had the opportunity to confess or claim to be innocent (Peters 2005, 81; 
Heyd 1973, 244-245; Jennings 1979, 153, 172; Peirce 2003, 102-103). If they confessed, 
they were sentenced to the appropriate penalty. If they claimed innocence, they had to 
defend themselves with a counter testimony or witness testimony against the plaintiff’s 
claims, which were heard first if the defendant requested (Peters 2005, 81; Heyd 1973, 
244-245; Jennings 1979, 153, 172; Ergene 2003, 64-65; Peirce 2003, 102-103). If the 
defendant could do so the case was closed without a hearing of the plaintiff’s witnesses 
(eyewitness) (Jennings 1979, 173). If the defendant could not provide a confession or a 
witness, then the plaintiff had to bring their evidence. If there was no witness provided 
by either side other evidence was sought, though the two sides of the case had a certain 
period of time to provide witnesses for their statement if they did not have any ready 
(Jennings 1979, 173; Peirce 2003, 102-103). Also, in certain crimes field investigation 
was done by a group that was organized by the kadı and consisted of the naib of the kadı, 
a representative of the sancakbey if the complaint had a criminal nature, and a group of 
Muslims. They were entitled to go anywhere in the district and settle the case there 
(Jennings 1978, 146-159; Ergene 2003, 152; Peirce 2003, 102-103). If there was no 
witness or written evidence of the plaintiff, an oath was required from the defendant by 
the plaintiff or kadı about their innocence (except for hadd offences), in case of an oath 
of innocence the defendant was absolved from all accusations. Rarely could defendants 
request an oath of innocence from a plaintiff. A fatwa could also be considered at this 
point (Jennings 1979, 175-176, 246; Ergene 2003, 64-65; Peirce 2003, 102-103). If the 
defendant refused to take an oath and denied the accusation, the judgement was made in 
favor of the plaintiff (Schacht 1985, 190, 192-193). 
 
After examining the evidence presented, the kadı either declared the innocence of the 
suspect or sentenced them to a penalty according to sharia, or sharia and kânûn depending 
on the case at hand (Heyd 1973, 254; Gerber 1994, 68; Jennings 1979, 153, 176). If the 
kadı found enough evidence to convict the suspect for the given allegation within the 
strength of the sharia, he would record the depositions or confessions of the witnesses and 
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his judgment of the punishment (Peters 2005, 75-76; Heyd 1973, 208; Schacht 1977, 90). 
The kadı sentenced the criminal either to a chastisement (tazîr) or to a fixed sharia penalty 
(Heyd 1973, 254). At the end of the trial a document that contained the facts of the case 
and the sentence was given to the executive officials so that they could give the necessary 
instructions (Heyd 1973, 255; Zarinebaf 2011, 26). 
 
However, even if enough evidence was not found or the right conditions were not present 
for a sharia conviction, the case might result in a siyâsa punishment. In this case, another 
document (hüccet) which contained the relevant information without the sentence was 
prepared by the kadı, then the case was handed over to the executive authorities to be 
dealt with according to siyâsa (Heyd 1973, 217-218, 266; Peters 2005, 82, 88; Zarinebaf 
2011, 26). Executive officials were able to take the necessary actions by the hüccet, but 
they could not take an action, or imprison or injure the person without the preliminary 
investigation of the kadı (Heyd 1973, 211, 266-267; Gerber 1994, 64; Imber 2006, 324-
325; Zarinebaf 2011, 10; Jennings 1979, 159-162; Peirce 2003, 118-119). However, in 
practice this was not the case all the time. There is a high possibility that criminal cases 
were handled predominantly by executive officials without being subjected to judicial 
procedure in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the kadı’s role remained as hearing 
the case and recording basic facts of the case before handing it over to the ehl-i örf (Heyd 
1973, 211, 266-267; Gerber 1994, 65-67; Imber 2006, 325; Zarinebaf 2011, 10, 20). 
 
Tazîr punishment was determined by the kadı and was to be inflicted immediately, 
sometimes in the presence of the kadı (Acar 2001, 65-67; Schacht 1982, 197). For capital 
punishment the approval of the sultan or grand vizier was needed, yet in practice it was 
also given by the governors (Zarinebaf 2011, 31; Heyd 1973, 251; Peters 2005, 89-91). 
The kadı also had to notify the great divan about cases regarding the military, foreigners, 
state interests, and public security that included violent offences, as well as cases that 
involved a certain amount of money (Zarinebaf 2011, 24-25; Ergene 2003, 51; Coşgel 
and Ergene 2016, 67). According to the order of the state kadıs, police officers and 
governors had to cooperate in the arrest and punishment of criminals without breaching 
the legal limits in accordance with the sharia and to report back to the kadı. Ideally 
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governors also had to have the verdict of the kadı before enforcing the death penalty. This 
was not the case all the time (Zarinebaf 2011, 32). 
 
In the judicial procedure, the last stage was to issue a fatwa which explained and 
summarized the case with all its facts, process, and verdict. In the case of the death penalty 
a fatwa was obligatory (Heyd 1973, 251; Peters 2005, 89-91). An appeal could be filed if 
a petition of revision sent to the sultan or the grand vizier was accepted (Heyd 1973, 258; 
Peters 2005, 91-92; Zarinebaf 2011, 29). In this case, a special investigator was appointed 
to reinvestigate the case and give a new decision, or the sultan could instruct the court to 
retry the case by the kadı (Heyd 1973, 212; Jennings 1979, 152). 
 
 
3.4. Prosecution, Punishment, and Heretics 
 
 
3.4.1. How the Ottoman Empire Identified the Kızılbaş in Mühimme Records 
 
In the sixteenth century the Ottoman state asserted and accepted certain behaviors, acts, 
and customary habits as the sign of certain socio-political groups. In this respect, 
particular attitudes and customs were associated with the Kızılbaş, who were seen as the 
main unorthodox or heretical group. According to these asserted allegations the 
prosecution of these communities proceeded. 
 
In the mühimme records, it is possible to follow the ways in which the Kızılbaş groups 
were identified. Groups who had certain religious practices wwere identified as Kızılbaş 
because these practices were perceived as rafz traditions and heretic rituals (rafz adeti 
üzere, âyîn-i bâtılları üzere). Kızılbaş groups and individuals were accused and punished 
both for what they did and for what they did not do. On the one hand they had specific 
traditions and customs that were seen as offences. On the other hand, they did not do what 
Sunni Muslims should do, which again was seen as an offence by the state Not to show 
compliance to certain Sunni religious practices such as fasting and praying or to be 
ignorant of (salât ve savm bilmemek) was taken as one of the signs of being a Kızılbaş by 
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the state. Individuals and groups who insulted or debased the practices of Islam and its 
values within the context of the Sunni understanding of Islam and Sunni religious 
practices and who insulted or debased Sunni Muslims through words or acts such as 
insulting the prophet, his followers, and the four caliphs (sebb-i Nebî, sebb-i Çehar-yâr, 
sebb-i sahâbeyi Güzîn) were labeled Kızılbaş. Any kind of affiliation with or help given 
to the Safavids or their Shi’i disciples such as making donations of any kind and giving 
alms, made them Kızılbaş groups or Kızılbaş individuals in the state’s judgement. 
Consequently, the Kızılbaş were accused of certain offences in relation to the attitudes 
and customs that were associated with being Kızılbaş. In cases we see the commitment of 
petty and grave offences and common immoralities by Kızılbaş individuals (Şavaş 2013, 
182, 186, 195, 205). Based on these, they were prosecuted. By using the mühimme 
records, the accusations that were made against the Kızılbaş groups by the state are 
categorized in this thesis as: 1) acts and deeds seen as contrary to Sunni Islam and the 
ehl-i sunnah, 2) tradition and practices seen as contrary to state-prescribed Islam in 
relation to public morality, 3) behavior seen as a threat to state security, 4) Common 
offences committed by the Kızılbaş, and 5) being Kızılbaş or Râfizî. The next chapter will 
include a detailed analysis and explanation of these accusations. 
 
 
3.4.2. Punishments That Were Given to the Kızılbaş 
 
According to mühimme records, there were a number of punishments. Exile was given 
for offences that were associated with Yukarı Cânib i.e. the Iran-Safavid side. Exiled 
Kızılbaş were forced to cut all ties with their families and localities. Imprisonment was 
practiced for precautional purposes, usually until the verdict for the ultimate punishment 
came from the Porte or until the accused were sent to the Porte for their actual punishment. 
Galley punishment, punishment by drowning, stoning, burning, and siyâset, i.e. the death 
penalty, are stated in the mühimme records among the punishments for the Kızılbaş (Savaş 
2013, 168, 170, 194). In many cases, the type of the penalty is not expressed openly, 
instead it is stated that the offender was to be dealt with (hakkında gelme), which mostly 
indicates a death penalty but might signify tazîr and sharia punishments as well (Savaş 
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2013, 196; Imber 1979, 270-271; Heyd 1973, 271, 257). Some orders only state that what 
the law necessitates should be done (Savaş 2013, 196). 
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4. ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE KIZILBAŞ 
 
 
 
4.1. Offences and the Kızılbaş 
 
 
The Ottoman state made certain accusations against Kızılbaş individuals and groups in its 
territories, especially in Anatolia. This chapter examines the accusations made by the state 
against the Kızılbaş and traces the links with religion and politics, both direct and indirect, 
of these accusations. These accusations were often made in terms of public and state 
security and the maintenance of Sunni Muslim society because Kızılbaş groups and 
individuals were seen as dangerous, “heretical,” and subversive politically and 
religiously. Scholars who study the accusations that were made against the Kızılbaş and 
their punishment either analyze the accusations as a whole without making any 
categorization (Refik 1932; Şener and Hezarfen 2002) or they take each offence as a 
single separate category, for example treating fornication as one category and robbery as 
another (Savaş 2018, 28-30). Here, I examine the accusations and offences that were 
made against the Kızılbaş in five main categories based on their type, content, and 
similarities, offering a broader categorization of offences rather than taking each offence 
or derivatives of one offence as a single category. I also show that while the offences can 
be categorized into five categories, these categories are intertwined with each other and 
overlap in different combinations.  
 
The accusations that were made against the Kızılbaş groups by the state can be 
categorized as: 1) acts and deeds seen as contrary to Sunni Islam and the ehl-i sunnah, 2) 
tradition and practices seen as contrary to state-prescribed Islam in relation to public 
morality, 3) behavior seen as a threat to state security, 4) Common offences committed 
51 
 
 
 
by the Kızılbaş, and 5) being Kızılbaş or Râfizî. Among them, the offences in the fourth 
and fifth categories are the ones that solely relate to Kızılbaş persons or groups. Mum 
söndürme and celebrating Ashura in a certain manner, which are in the second category, 
as well as propaganda and various acts of Safavid disciples and interaction with the 
Safavid side, which are in the third category, were also specific to Kızılbaş groups or 
individuals. There are also certain offences among categories that are not solely specific 
to Kızılbaş individuals and groups, as other non-Sunni or Sunni Muslim individuals and 
groups could conduct such behaviors, such as insulting the prophet, not conducting 
religious practices, collecting money, collecting money and alms for certain purposes, 
and attempting to a rebellion. Therefore, at first glance these may not seem like 
accusations against Kızılbaş. However, when the identity of the person who committed 
these acts is expressed or implied as Kızılbaş or râfizî in the orders, they can be considered 
among the accusations against Kızılbaş individuals and groups by the state. By detecting 
these accusations, we can see what kind of accusations were made against Kızılbaş groups 
and individuals who were seen as religiously and politically subversive, and thus present 
a picture of the state’s relationship with the Kızılbaş. 
 
 
4.1.1. Acts and Deeds Seen as Contrary to Sunni Islam and the Ehl-i Sunnah  
 
Starting with the first category, the Ottoman state investigated and punished people who 
were identified as Kızılbaş or were required report on them because it was heard or known 
that they insulted or debased the values, persons, and practices of the ehl-i sunnah. 
According to mühimme records insulting the prophet, his followers, and the four caliphs, 
debasing and insulting the Sunni Muslim community and their practices such as daily 
prayer and fasting, and denying and not applying these religious practices were seen very 
often as offences. Similarly, there are cases of rejection of the day of judgment. These 
accusations can be collected as one single category under the name of acts and deeds seen 
contrary to Sunni Islam and the ehl-i sunnah. 
 
Insulting the four caliphs together with having râfizî madhab or being Kızılbaş were 
common accusations in this category. For example, Şehsuvar from Sereca was accused 
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of insulting the four caliphs in 1583. He was also accused of having râfizî madhab (Şener 
and Hezarfen, 2002, 181). There are further orders in which individuals were accused of 
not only insulting the four caliphs and/or the prophet but also of being Kızılbaş and not 
ehl-i sunnah. They were accused of being in treason against the ehl-i sunnah as in the 
case of Ahmed, Deran, Lemderhan, and Readbican from Çorum, in 1584. They were 
accused of being Kızılbaş and not ehl-i sunnah. According to the order, it was known by 
the Muslim community that they had insulted the four caliphs, committed treason against 
the ehl-i sunnah, and were constantly malignant (Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 197). In 1588, 
local authorities wrote a letter to the Porte stating that Ali and his son Mehmet from the 
village of Hızırbey in Çorum were from the Revâfiz community and that they had insulted 
the prophet and the four caliphs, printed counterfeit money among other accusations 
(Savaş 2018, 213; Şener and Hezafen 2002, 217). In the above examples, having a râfizî 
madhab (or, in different versions of this expression, having rafz and being from Revâfiz 
community) is a very clear accusation in meaning and significance.  
 
Regarding the accusations of not being from the ehl-i sunnah and committing treason 
against the ehl-i sunnah, as in the case of Ahmed, Deran, Lemderhan, and Readbican 
from Çorum, the authorities probably accused these individuals of being Kızılbaş because 
Kızılbaş were not considered part of the ehl-i sunnah, and thus in a wider sense part of 
Islam, by the state and Ottoman jurists of the sixteenth century, as explained in the 
previous chapters.  
 
Other than the above cases, accusations of mocking or denying certain beliefs of Sunni 
Muslims can be included in the acts and deeds seen contrary to Sunni Islam and the ehl-i 
sunnah, particularly the denial of the Day of Judgement. One such case was that of Koyun 
Baba who was accused of denying the haşr ü neşr (day of judgement), and having ilhâd 
and rafz (Savaş 2018, 181). There are also cases in which individuals were accused of 
denying the day of judgement and committing other offences which are not strictly 
associated with religious values. Taşcıoğlu Yusuf’s case is one of them. Taşcıoğlu Yusuf 
was accused of both denying the day of judgement and being zındîk and a thief in 1588 
(Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 215). 
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Kızılbaş individuals and groups also ignored, denied, or debased certain other religious 
practices. These acts were likewise seen as contrary to the Sunni understanding of Islam 
and ehl-i sunnah, and thus considered an offence by the state. In 1583 Pir Nazar from 
İskilip was accused of being a Kızılbaş and of depicting himself as “caliph” (chosen 
individuals that were sent to Anatolia by the Safavids for propaganda and for rallying 
supporters) by the Muslim community of İbik, a village in the İskilip district. He was 
accused of not praying because the imam’s name was Omar, and not cursing the shah 
when he was asked to do so in the sharia court (Savaş 2018, 210; Şener and Hezarfen 
2002, 179). Here it is seen that an individual did not pray because the imam’s name was 
a Sunni name and did not curse the shah when it was demanded. In the eyes of the state 
this was a clear sign that he was a Kızılbaş.  
 
In another case dated 1592 in Niksar, individuals named Ali Kulu Abdal, Katurcı Deli 
İbrahim, and Emin Koca were accused of not praying or fasting, like Pir Nazar above, but 
their reason was different. They said that their God was Ali, that they did not have to pray 
and fast according to their belief and that their Kaaba was the tomb of imam Hüseyin 
(Savaş 2018, 213). Here in the words of the suspects it is seen that the defiance of Sunni 
Islam was not just done by ignoring religious duties, but also by humiliating, insulting, 
and denying their existence and legitimacy. In these cases, it can be said that not only the 
acts of the suspects but also their verbal expressions were considered an offence. Here, 
there is an indirect reference to being Kızılbaş.  
 
These cases show that people were identified directly or indirectly as Kızılbaş/râfizî and 
were at the same time accused of not conducting Sunni Islamic practices or denying them 
in various forms. In some orders, it is just stated that they do not practice certain 
requirements of Islam (according to the Sunni understanding of it) such as praying or 
fasting. In others, the reasons for not participating in religious practices or not conducting 
them are conveyed based on the statements of the offenders cited in the orders. 
 
Kızılbaş individuals were also accused of general immorality or malignancy without 
explanation or definition. However, it can be said that these immoralities were mostly 
related to Sunni understandings of Islam. Acting against the sharia (hilâf-ı şer), reneging, 
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gossiping, lying, or having attitudes that are malignant with respect to (Sunni) Muslims 
and inciting them to the wrong path can also be considered in this category of accusation. 
They can be found together with other offences that were not committed directly against 
religion, such as robbery. The case of Bekir bin Cevher who was from the Paşa village, 
and the case of Aşık, Emir, and Zati from Karahisar, are similar to each other. All these 
men were accused of making unjust complains about Muslims ehl-i örf, offending the 
hilâf-ı şer by their manners, and acting against the hilâf-ı şer in 1585 and 1583, 
respectively (Savaş 2018, 212-213; Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 187). While Bekir was 
accused of being râfizî and Kızılbaş, Emir and Aşık only were accused of being Kızılbaş. 
According to the document, this accusation of being Kızılbaş was not made against Zati, 
who thus may not have been a Kızılbaş, but only a person who acted against sharia, robbed 
people, and caused problems for Muslims (Savaş 2018, 212-213; Şener and Hezarfen 
2002, 187). All of them were accused of robbery and malignancy as well (Savaş 2018, 
212-213; Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 187). 
 
Overall, while certain offences can be put into the category of acts and deeds that were 
seen as contrary to Sunni Islam and ehl-i sunnah based on their similarities, this category 
overlaps with others, as will be seen below, and includes different types of accusations 
too. For example, in the cases of Pir Nazar from 1583, Taşcıoğlu Yusuf from 1588, and 
Bekir Bin Cevher from 1585 above we also see accusations of being loyal to Iran, which 
was seen as a threat to state security with accusations of violating and debasing the 
principles and values of the Sunni understanding of Islam and the ehl-i sunnah. In the 
above cases, the accusations of being Kızılbaş were also combined with petty crimes and 
immoralities. Hence, the petty offences can be found alongside offences that were seen 
contrary to the Sunni understanding of Islam and offences that were seen as threats to 
state security.  
 
 
4.1.2. Traditions or Religious Practices Seen as Contrary to State Prescribed 
Islam in Relation to Public Morality 
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Kızılbaş individuals and groups were accused of following some traditions or religious 
practices which were seen as contrary to state prescribed Islam. One of these was the 
âyîn-i Cem which is both a cultural and a religious practice. Âyîn-i Cem was the Kızılbaş 
name for the practice of their ritual, which was called mum söndürme by the Ottoman 
authorities. This practice included gathering in mixed groups in an isolated place, singing 
songs with musical instruments, and drinking alcohol, and the state assumed that acts of 
sexual intercourse were also present. The state saw it as a slanderous and offensive act 
and was seen as an offence itself. 
 
There are many orders regarding the act of mum söndürme and/or what it entails. In 1571, 
İlyas from Hamidbüki village accused certain individuals from certain districts of mum 
söndürme and being Kızılbaş. He was not the only one. According to the order, there were 
other complaints by the community as well regarding these people and the said offences. 
A woman testified that her husband, Kara Receb, and some other people practiced mum 
söndürme and were Kızılbaş in the sharia court (Yıldırım et al. 1996, 68).  
 
Mum söndürme or the acts it entailed was also defined as âyîn-i bâtın (heretic ceremony) 
as we can see in an order dated 1577 which was sent to the beylerbey of Rum and the 
kadıs of Çorum and Mecidiözü in which the act was not defined as mum söndürme but as 
âyîn-i bâtıl (heretic ceremony). In this order Habil, who was stated as Shi’i disciple, 
Mehmet, Mahmut Baba, Kasım, and Hasan were accused of conducting the behaviors 
that were defined as mum söndürme in accordance with their heretical ceremony (âyîn-i 
bâtılları üzere). At the same time, they were accused of pretending to be Sunni Muslims 
while actually being Kızılbaş and bringing self-indulgent people (ehl-i hevâ) to their 
gatherings. These were seen as acts of fesâd (malignancy) (Savaş 2018, 193).  
 
Besides being defined as mum söndürme and âyîn-i bâtıl, the act of gathering in mixed 
groups and drinking wine was defined as a practice of the Kızılbaş. It is possible to see 
an example of this in an order dated 1577 in which a person named Beğ from the Tola(?)* 
village of Çorum was accused of gathering with men and women and drinking wine in 
accordance with Kızılbaş practice (Kızılbaş tavrı üzere) by Emir and Mehmet sipahis and 
others. According to the order, many offerings, sacrificial animals, çerâğ and nezir (gifts 
56 
 
 
 
and money) were collected and given to Beğ by various people. Therefore, he was 
implicitly accused of collecting them (Savaş 2018, 195; Şener and Hezarfen, 2002, 101).  
 
Irene Melikoff states that Bektaşi and Alevi communities were accused of drinking at 
night, which was called mum söndü. According to Melikoff, Alevis sacrificed a rooster 
in the sülük ceremony. People who accuse them of mum söndürme and drinking claim 
that the drinking started after the rooster crowed and the mums (candles) were 
extinguished. She explains that because Alevis and Bektaşis were forced to do their rituals 
and practices at night and in secret, this turned them into closed communities and 
eventually brought a secrecy and they came to known as practicing rituals in secret. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the ceremonies with alcohol started after the ayin-i cem that 
was done at night and when the mums that were lit were extinguished, which is why it 
was called mum söndü by the people who accused these groups. It can be said that in the 
Ottoman context and legal documents not only was âyîn-i cem disparagingly named mum 
söndürme and seen as an offence itself, but there was also the assumption and 
consequently the accusation of having illegal sexual intercourse which accompanied this 
tradition/religious practice of the Kızılbaş (Melikoff 1993, 26-27, 89-90; Doğan and Çelik 
2014, 129-130). 
 
In respect to the Kızılbaş attitude and rafz tradition, there are cases specific to Mosul in 
which people were accused of gathering during Ashura, and celebrating it in a specific 
manner (with kettledrum and nakkâre, with music) thus breaching the banishment of it. 
This meant that it was against the hilâf-ı şer and was a betrayal of the ehl-i sunnah and 
the Muslim community. It can be said that these were all treated as the tradition, practice, 
or ceremony of rafz and the Kızılbaş in the orders and were predominantly associated 
with them (Savaş 2018, 182; Yıldırım et al. 1995, 388). 
 
In accordance with the discourses and understandings of the age the Safavids and the 
Ottomans had similar motives, and both of them called each other “heretic and rebel.” 
They tried to suppress Sunni and Shi’i Islam respectively as the protectors of the “true 
Islamic belief.” (Imber 2006, 57-58; Lewis 1996, 113-114; Faroqhi and Fleet 2013, 11, 
107). Therefore, in the Ottoman Empire these specific acts such as mum söndürme, or 
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events such as Ashura acted out by Kızılbaş groups, were seen as offences for two reasons. 
Firstly, they contained certain acts such as drinking alcohol and assumed illegal sexual 
intercourse which are directly contrary to Sunni Islamic teaching. Secondly, these acts 
were seen as an offence due to their potential of corrupting Muslims, Sunni Muslim 
society, and its morality. It is possible to see this concern in the form of an accusation in 
the example of Habil, Mehmet, Mahmut Baba, Kasım, and Hasan, in which they were 
accused of acting Sunni while actually being Kızılbaş and of inviting people to their illicit 
gathering. Hence, they were considered as an offence by the state in 1577 (Savaş 2018, 
193). In a similar order dated 1577, in Manisa “Kızılbaş” and “melâhide” İmir Ali, 
Hamza, and Sofuoğlu Mehmet were accused of being followers of “mülhid” Baba Bendi 
who had been burned at the stake and whose followers had been dispersed. They were 
also accused of gathering in an isolated place, leading ignorant non-Muslims from their 
beliefs, and converting them (Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 113). This is an extraordinary 
case. Although in theory there is no burning as a punishment in the sharia, appreantly it 
was appllied in practice. According to Taner Akçam, AbuBakr applied burning at the 
stake as punishment for apostates. For the Ottoman period Akçam describes the burning 
of Fazıl Tebrizi who was a Hurufi in the Edirne mosque by the head müftü of the period. 
He states that this happened before 1465. As a source for this event Akçam gives Rıza 
Zelyut’s narrative which conveys this story form Taşköprülüzade’s Şakaik-i Numaniyye 
(Akçam 1992, 25, 61, 354). 
 
Therefore while playing music and dance were not offences in state-prescribed Sunni 
Islam and public morality, conducting them as religious practice and together with the 
acts of drinking wine, gathering of unrelated men and women, and having assumed illegal 
sexual intercourse which are contrary to Sunni Islamic understandings and were seen as 
contrary to public morality and the Islamic understanding of the sixteenth-century 
Ottoman Empire made this act of mum söndürme an offence in the state’s regard.  
 
These acts that are mentioned here can be found together with the acts which are in the 
first category of offences: acts seen as contrary to Sunni Islam and the ehl-i sunnah. The 
following examples demonstrate this. In an order dated 1569, besides being accused of 
mum söndürme and having râfizî madhab, Hacı bin Isa, Receb bin Ramazan, Yusuf bin 
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Ramazan, Mustafa bin Hasan, Bayram bin Pir Ali, Himmet bin Turak, and Mehmed bin 
Musa were also accused of never praying, never fasting, and insulting the four caliphs 
(Yıldırım et al. 1999, 81-82). In 1581 certain individuals who were stated as being from 
the Revâfiz community and being mülhid were accused of not only gathering with their 
wives and daughters at nights and having illegal sexual intercourse with one another’s 
wives and daughters, but also of insulting the four caliphs and Muslims by calling them 
Yezid openly, and not knowing how to pray and fast. In addition to these accusations, they 
were also accused of not naming their sons with the names of Omar and Osman and not 
carrying the name of Omar or Osman themselves. Moreover, among them there were 
people who were Shi’i disciples of Iran and they brought their shah’s possessions and 
circulated them in the region. Also, it is said that the disciples Celal and Resul arranged 
gatherings for the sake of religion and influenced other people in this. Therefore, they 
were accused of acting against the sharia (Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 147). Similar 
accusations can be found in an order about certain Kızılbaş and “mülhid” tâife in various 
districts and in another order dated 1592. In them individuals were accused not only of 
the offense of mum söndürme and related offences, but were also accused of acting against 
hilâf-ı şer and insulting the four caliphs (Savaş 2013, 206; Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 219).  
 
There are also cases in which the abovementioned acts above are found together with acts 
seen as a threat to state security. Since being a disciple and collecting nezir, çerâğ, and 
sacrificial animals are among these offences, the case of Beğ from Tola and the cases of 
Celal and Resul from the order dated 1581 can be considered examples of this association. 
Moreover, it is possible to see accusations in these three categories in the same order. 
Therefore, these orders demonstrate that various kinds of offences can be found in the 
same order and individuals can be accused of all of them.  
 
 
 
4.1.2. Conduct Seen as a Threat to State Security  
 
Any act that provided material and verbal support to the Safavids by Kızılbaş groups or 
individuals was seen as a threat to state security by the Ottoman state. Any related act that 
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could endanger the state and its security was also seen as a threat. These conducts can be 
divided into four groups: a) any kind of material and verbal support i.e. collecting and 
sending money, alms, sacrificial animals, precious metals, and weapons, b) any act of 
propaganda, espionage, or rallying supporters which are usually done by disciples, c) any 
act that jeopardizes or sabotages the state itself or its acts, including rebellion, d) any 
interaction with and/or inclination to the Yukarı Cânib i.e. Iran-Safavid side or any act in 
relation to it. They can be collected under one category as acts that were seen as a threat 
to state security. They were seen as punishable acts by the state because they were 
perceived as menaces to state security. 
 
In this category many orders are about collecting and sending money, alms, sacrificial 
animals, metals such as iron, timber, and weapons to the Safavid side. For example, in 
1565 Bali bin Saruca, Mehmed bin Turak, Mirza bin Mustafa, Halil bin Hamza, and 
Zülfikar bin Mehmed were sentenced to siyâsa punishment because they took clothes and 
gold from the public saying that it was nuzur (money). They were caught on their way to 
Yukarı Cânib and confessed their crimes (Yıldırım et al. 1995, 242-243). In another order 
dated 1579, during the investigation of villages near Ankara that were known with rafz 
and ilhâd and that were accused of being so, two individuals who were accused of 
collecting nezir and gifts from the inhabitants of the village were caught (Şener and 
Hezarfen 2002, 127). In the same manner, Hacı Mehmet, khatib of Cami-i Kebir accused 
Eymir Hasan, Mustafa, and Kürtül Mustafa of giving horseshoes and studs to Yukarı 
Cânib annually in 1568. Also, according to the order another person named Enişin(?) bin 
Yusuf was accused of being in the service of Yukarı Cânib and interacting with it (Yıldırm 
et al. 1999, 6-7). In a different order dated 1568 regarding the smuggling of valuable 
metals to the Safavid territory, the Porte inquired how 183 carriages of timber and iron 
were collected from the interior provinces and transported to Şark Cânibi (East side) and 
why it was not prevented despite the fact that it had been forbidden (Yıldırım et al. 1999, 
368). There are cases in which sheep were sent rather than metals or money to Yukarı 
Cânib. The Ulus community from Erzurum was accused of sending sheep to the Kızılbaş 
Cânib in 1545. According to the order, this action had been forbidden by the state 
(Sahillioğlu 2002, 306). 
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In these cases, certain people provided material or financial support to Iran. Celalzade in 
his Tabakât states that the power base of the Kızılbaş was Anatolia because it was there 
that they were getting their weapons and materials (Boyar 2013, 114). The orders seem 
to demonstrate the accuracy of his statement. Therefore, it can be said that the state 
considered the transfer of any metal from its lands to the Safavids’ lands as an offence 
and a punishable act. These orders demonstrate that this kind of offence was committed 
in our examples by Kızılbaş groups and individuals with the aim of helping Iran. There 
are orders that indicate the aim behind this action very clearly. For instance, in 1568 
certain “melâhide” people were accused of collecting alms and nuzur (money) and of 
giving them to the envoy of Yukarı Cânib who came to Âsitâne-i Sâadet (the capital) with 
the permission of the sultan (Yıldırm et al. 1999, 4-5, 317). According to another order 
certain people from the communities of İzlü, Rişvan, Eşkanlı Solaklu, Şeyh Hüseyinlü, 
Soydanlı, Eğribüklü, Adalu, Kalaçaklu, Bezki, Çakallu, Mihriman, Karasaz, and 
Kömürlü were accused of sending nezir (money) to the şâki (the evil person) who 
appeared in the name of Shah Ismail (Savaş 2018, 198-199). 
 
In these cases, we can see the economic implication of Safavid propaganda and the 
employment of disciples. In one of these orders it is indicated that the money and alms 
were collected by disciples in the name of the shah. It is known that until Bayezid II 
annual financial help was sent to the Safeviyye order by the state. Although Ismail and 
Tahmasp were not the leaders of a religious order but rather heads of a state, it seems that 
this practice had been continued by the population and could not be prevented by the 
Ottoman state even after the Amasya peace and continued in Murad III’s reign (Boyar 
2013, 98, 132; Refik 1932, 39–40). It is not certain whether this economic help was sent 
to the Ardabil lodge as religious alms or as a contribution to political aims. In both cases 
it was unacceptable by the Ottoman state. However, since the annual help to the Safeviyye 
order was cut when the Safavids became a political entity and a threat to the Ottoman 
state, the Ottoman state assumed that money and any kind of metal that were sent to the 
Safavid state was for political aims. Therefore, it was considered an offence that 
threatened state security and was punished accordingly.  
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Besides providing material and financial help to the Safavids, Kızılbaş groups and 
individuals were also accused of espionage, rallying supporters, making propaganda, and 
consequently of being disciples of Iran. In most of the orders, the quality and content of 
espionage, rallying supporters, and propaganda are not stated. There are only statements 
of the offences that were committed. However, it can be said that they had both a religious 
and political quality. For instance, persons named Veled-i Babay and Sulbioğlu Pir Civan 
were accused of espionage besides being famous for their ilhâd and rafz, collecting alms 
and money for Yukarı Cânib, and taking them there (Savaş 2018, 194). In 1583, all the 
inhabitants of the town of Hoy that was reconquered from “Kızılbaş bed-ma’aş” were 
accused of being râfizî and betraying the community of ehl-i sunnah. They were also 
accused of espionage for Yukarı Cânib (Şener and Hazerfen 2002, 177).  
 
According to another order dated 1577, certain “melâhide” people were accused of 
interacting with Yukarı Cânib, sending nuzur and alms, and espionage (Savaş 2018, 188-
189). In 1568, Süleyman Fakih was accused of being one of the disciples of Yukarı Cânib, 
allying and gathering with other “melâhide” and “müfsid” who were also disciples of 
Yukarı Cânib and they were accused of misleading Muslims (Yıldırım et al. 1999, 47-48). 
Sipahi Hamza oğlu Ibrahim accused Ihtiyar oğlu Mansur Halife who was a relative of 
Emir Ali Halife and Helkeri(?) /Nakleni oğlu(?) and other “râfizî” and “mülhid” people 
of being disciples of the Yukarı Cânib and interacting with it in 1579 (Savaş 2018, 202; 
Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 125). Cevşid(?) oğlu Hüseyin was accused of being a disciple 
of the shah in 1578 (Savaş 2018, 197; Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 115). In a similar fashion, 
Nur Baba from the community of Dokuz was accused of being Kızılbaş and being the 
head of approximately 1000 people in the province. He was also accused of interacting 
with Yukarı Cânib and gathering in an isolated place for ayin-i bi-l-ilhâd (heretic 
ceremony) in 1578 (Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 121).  
 
The shah sent his disciples to the Ottoman land to do his propaganda and this propaganda 
was both political and religious. Hadidi in his account states that the people named as 
“caliph” who were sent by the shah led “astray the ignorant people,” called them to their 
own madhab committing treachery and deceit in Anatolia (Hadidi 1991, 385-386). 
Celalzade Mustafa has similar explanations in his account (Celalzade 1990, 129). In these 
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orders, there is no explanation regarding what kind of propaganda, mobilization of 
supporters, and espionage were done. However, implications such as misleading people, 
gathering and allying with other disruptors, and “melâhide” are stated in the documents 
regarding these activities of Kızılbaş and their disciples. The state claimed that the 
gatherings and participation in “âyîn-i bâtıl” were ways in which the Kızılbaş conveyed 
the political and religious message of the Safavids and to attract or in the eyes of the state 
to “mislead” Muslims to the “heretic” Shi’i understanding and consequently its protector, 
the shah.  
 
In one order, it is stated that Nur Baba was the head of approximately 1000 people who 
were Kızılbaş and adherents of the Safavid. Their number alone was enough to create the 
potential danger of rebellion. There were instances of rebellion that were initiated by 
caliphs of Iran in Ottoman history. The Şah Kulu rebellion was started by Şah Kulu Baba 
Tekeli, son of Haydar Halife who was a principal follower of sheik Haydar (Imber 2006, 
56-57). In 1520 the Şah Veli bin Celal rebellion was provoked by the Safavids. Baba 
Zünnün who led the Turcomans to rebel in 1526 was a sufi preacher, and there was also 
Safavid influence in this revolt (Boyar 2013, 115). In the same manner the Kalenderoğlu 
revolt was also initiated by a dervish and supported by the Turcoman masses who were 
supportive of the Safavids religiously and politically (Shaw 1976, 92; Imber 2006, 64). 
While economic and political causes were dominant in these revolts, the Safavid 
propaganda to gather adherents that was undertaken by their followers was effective in 
these revolts. Therefore, any kind of propaganda, rallying of supporters, or espionage that 
was done by disciples and the potential harm that these acts carried was considered an 
offence in religio-political axis and punished accordingly by the state.  
 
Besides these revolts, there were others that were not realized. In an order dated 1578, 
Suleyman from the village of Vasıl (between Antep and Birecik) was accused of rebelling 
against the state by gathering 40-50 men and going to join the person from Şam Bayadi 
Turcoman who claimed that he was Shah Ismail, and rebelled against the state (Şener and 
Hezarfen 2002, 119). Similarly, in 1585, sheikh Haydar from Bolnu, a village in the 
Amasya district, was accused of being a disciple of Kızılbaş, collecting nezir for the shah, 
and organizing gatherings in places where there were Kızılbaş, and of saying “I was with 
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the shah, I was delegated with collecting forty thousand men from this side. Be ready 
immediately. The shah will surely come to this side.”. He was accused of preparing to 
rebel by the community of Amasya (Savaş 2018, 211; Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 207).  
 
There are also orders in which Kızılbaş were accused of jeopardizing the state’s acts and 
movements. In an order dated 1582/1583, certain “Kızılbaş-ı bed ma’aş” were accused of 
preventing the supply of provisions and money to Tiflis. They were also accused of 
plundering animal flocks (Ünal 1995, 81). In 1583/1584, Emir Han from the Kızılbaş side 
was accused of conducting malignancy constantly in Ottoman lands, building castles in 
the districts of Urmiye, Selemas, and Koyi, and putting many men in these castles. 
According to the order, the Beylerbey of Van stated that the security and protection of the 
country were not possible because of this situation (Ünal 1995, 163). It is understood that 
these acts undermined state security by putting the state in a weak position against the 
Safavid threats. They were done by Kızılbaş individuals or groups who gave active 
political support to the Safavids. 
 
In addition to these, there are many accusations for the offence of interacting with Yukarı 
Cânib and/or being inclined to it. According to an order dated 1577, certain people were 
accused of alliance and adherence to Yukarı Cânib, as well as having ilhâd and rafz. It 
was stated that many people traveled between Ottoman and Iran (Savaş 2018, 189). In 
another order dated 1577 people from the communities of Basyan and Bozyan were 
accused of alliance and adherence to Yukarı Cânib as well as having rafz and ilhâd (Savaş 
2018, 189). In a different order dated 1566 certain dirlik (land smaller than fief) holders 
in Van were accused of being Kızılbaş and allying with Yukarı Cânib (Savaş 2013, 161). 
According to a record dated 1514 in the kadı sicil of Üsküdar, Seydi Sevindik was brought 
to court with the accusation of being Kızılbaş and speaking with a Persian envoy at night 
in his tent (Yılmaz 2008, 129).  
 
By looking these cases, it cannot be said with certainty what comprised the acts of 
interaction, alliance, and inclination, or what the state understood by these terms. There 
are only expressions of “inclination to Yukarı Cânib” or “interaction with Yukarı Cânib” 
in most of the orders and they do not give a clear indication of what this could be. This is 
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unlike the cases of espionage or acts of disciples in which the conduct that was seen as a 
threat to state security can be predicted. 
 
It can be asserted that these interactions referred to all activities by disciples of the Shah 
and the possibility of those accused of being disciples as in the case of Seydi Sevindik 
who was accused of being Kızılbaş and speaking with the envoy of Iran in 1514. This 
indicates that he was possibly a disciple and was planning propaganda and/or espionage 
for Iran. Other than this, it can be said that accusations of interaction contained the acts 
of sending monetary and material help to Yukarı Cânib by Kızılbaş or Kızılbaş 
sympathizers as well as taking a part in an act which jeopardized state security and/or in 
an illicit gathering where Safavid propaganda was made. Besides these, it can be assumed 
that the accusation of being in interaction with Yukarı Cânib signified the general way of 
conduct or character of Kızılbaş and all possible acts that were considered a threat to state 
security could be committed by them. 
 
For example, Süleyman, his brother, Aygud, Kara Yaşmakçı, Hızır Halife, Oruç, and 
Kara Ibrahim were accused of being Kızılbaş and interacting with Yukarı Cânib (Savaş, 
2018, 202). According to another order among people who were in prison because they 
interacted with Yukarı Cânib, Usta Divane Mahmut Halife, and İç(?) Haydar and Oruç 
from the Hüseyinabad district escaped from prison (Savaş, 2018, 203). In 1570, 59 
“melâhide” were accused of having adherence to Yukarı Cânib in Amasya (Şener and 
Hezarfen 2002, 43). In all these cases the offence of interacting with or inclination to 
Yukarı Cânib can be interpreted as a general sympathy towards Iran and it can be taken 
in terms of the possibility of committing an offence that would threaten state security. 
These people were either Kızılbaş or accused of being so by the state, and they committed 
acts contrary to state security. 
 
Overall, Kızılbaş persons or groups were accused of various offences that were connected 
to Yukarı Cânib and were committed for the benefit of the Safavids and to the detriment 
of the Ottoman state. These accusations range from being a disciple of Iran, having 
sympathy for and an inclination towards Yukarı Cânib, to provoking people to 
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insurgency, espionage, propaganda, and sending money to Iran. They can be categorized 
as acts seen as a threat to state security. 
 
Like other categories, offences that threatened state security can be found together with 
offences from other categories such as the offences in the first and second categories. 
While this can be traced in the above cases, the following cases show this association 
more clearly. In the year 1584 Dervişoğlu Şaban was accused of being Kızılbaş, râfizî, 
and interacting with Iran. He was also accused of insulting the four caliphs and gathering 
with unrelated women at night with song and music (Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 191). 
According to an order dated 1577, Pir Ahmed was accused of interacting with Yukarı 
Cânib, sending offerings there, gathering with unrelated women, and insulting the four 
caliphs (Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 95).  
 
In 1565, Alaybeyi Ali and some of his relatives were accused of various offences. He was 
accused of bullying the sipahi community and inhabitants of the area. Also, he was 
accused of sending his people, relatives, and guards to a person named Hüsam who he 
appointed as naib. One of his relatives, Katib Hasan Babası, was accused of saying “no 
sword can be held against the shah” in the eastern campaign and leaving his dirlik. He 
was also accused of having relatives who had dirliks in Yukarı Cânib. He was accused of 
corresponding and interacting with Yukarı Cânib constantly. Besides these, Ak Mehmet 
who was a relative of Alaybeyi Ali was accused of saying, “a cloth of Shah Ismail is a 
remedy for women who cannot give birth to a child.” (Savaş 2018, 160-161). In another 
order, the kadı of Koyluhisar accused Sipahi Bayram bin Pirzade and certain people from 
the district of Cafer of being Kızılbaş and insulting the four caliphs in front of a person 
named Eşref Halife who was from the community of Tat. The kadı of Koyluhisar also 
accused them of drinking water from the cloth of shah Mehmet and giving their wives’ 
jewelry to the Sürhser (Kızılbaş in Persian) as nezir (Savaş 2018, 174-175).  
 
Lastly, in an order dated 1585 many people were accused of various offences. Pirden and 
Mehmet from the village of Maraza (?) were accused of being Kızılbaş and bringing nezir 
to the shah. In the same order from the village of Maraza (?), Çapardan Ali Pir Cabi, 
Kerim Cabi, and a person named Yusuf from Sofılar, a village in the Kengiri district, 
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individuals named Sorca Ali, Kara Mehmet, and Süleyman from Kınık, a village in the 
Kalacık district, and lastly a person named Zeynel from Erçek, a village in the Kurşunlu 
district were accused of being râfizî. A person named Yusuf was accused of being a 
disciple of these people, arranging gatherings with his followers in Sofılar village, and of 
insulting the four caliphs (Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 205). In these cases people were 
accused of both offences that threatened state security, and the mum söndürme rite and 
insulting the four caliphs which were seen as contrary to Sunni Islam and public morality. 
Therefore, as these orders demonstrate, in this category as well there are overlaps with 
other categories.  
 
 
4.1.4. Common Offences Committed by the Kızılbaş  
 
Other than the more specific offences mentioned previously, Kızılbaş individuals and 
groups were involved in common offences such as robbery, rape, and immoral behavior, 
that any person from any religion or sect can commit. In most cases Kızılbaş/râfizî 
individuals or groups who were defined and accused as such were also accused of these 
common offences and not necessarily of those offences which were more related to the 
“political” and/or “religious” connotations and attitudes of the Kızılbaş. In orders, first 
the persons or groups are accused of being Kızılbaş/râfizî, mülhid, or ehl-i fesâd, and then 
they are accused of common offences. In the punishment part, the statement of them being 
Kızılbaş/râfizî is reasserted before the punishment is prescribed. This gives the impression 
that their identification as Kızılbaş was not a complementary or additional qualification 
to strengthen the actual accusation, but was part of the actual offence.  
 
For example, according to an order dated 1577, Nebi Bin Rüstem, Hasan bin Ali, Nur Ali 
bin Ekber, and Salbaş Hızır from the Havza district were found guilty of rafz, ilhâd, 
malignancy, and robbery in the presence of toprak kadısı (Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 87). 
In the Karahisar Şarki region some people were accused of being Kızılbaş, râfizî, and 
mülhid. They were also accused of robbery, aiding robbery, and waylaying in 1585. In 
addition, they were accused of having gatherings and communities in the villages and 
having attitudes that are malignant and against sharia (Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 107). 
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In 1572 Şah Hüseyin, his son Mehmet, and other individuals named Pir Kulu, Hasan, 
Hüseyin, Şahkulu, Şahiddürrühman Eryetdi, Veli, Şah-Ali, Sevindik, and Seyhi were 
accused of being Kızılbaş and ehl-i fesâd, robing the possessions of Muslims, and 
assaulting Muslim women (Yıldırm et al. 1996, 101). In a different order dated 
1568/1569, two people named Murad and Veled who were known as Şerefbeğlü were 
accused of being Kızılbaş and being brigands of Dulkadirlü by the kadı of Derende. They 
were accused of waylaying between Derende and the Elbistan district. According to the 
order, they robbed Muslims’ possessions and took their wives, horses, and mules by force 
with 15-20 brigands in Derende (1999, 202, 255).  
 
We cannot, at this point, gather from the sources whether there was something specific to 
being Kızılbaş in relation to these accusations. However, it seems that being Kızılbaş was 
associated with common offences.  Here, we see that Kızılbaş people were accused of 
more precise and concrete offences such as robbery and waylaying in comparison to 
accusations of being malignant. In these accusations of common offences and turpitudes 
Kızılbaş groups and individuals were not considered predominantly subversive to the 
state politically and religiously. In these cases, it seems that they were seen as disrupting 
social peace and order. They show that from time to time Kızılbaş were accused and 
punished for actions that were disruptive to the moral and social norms of society and 
security, and not for acts that could be interpreted as the result of political and religious 
opposition. 
 
The most common offences that can be considered in this category were robbery, abetting 
a robbery, waylaying, rape, harassing people, and malignant behavior. According to the 
orders that can be put in this category, Kızılbaş groups and individuals were accused of 
acts that disrupted and threatened other individuals and public security, as well as the 
morality and wellbeing of society, in the same way that other non-Kızılbaş groups were. 
4.1.5. Being Kızılbaş or Râfizî as a Punishable Quality  
 
It seems that aside from the other offences stated in this work, to be known as a Kızılbaş, 
râfizî, or mülhid, or to be reported as one or all of these, individuals and communities 
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could be investigated, reported, and punished without a definite accusation. Hence, this 
can be considered another category. For instance, in 1572 Erdivan, Çırak, and Ali, who 
were sheikhs in a Matayı lodge, as well as certain other people, were accused of being 
Kızılbaş and râfizî. According to the statement of witnesses, previously their brother 
Erzman had been recorded in the Sürsher notebook and executed by the beylerbey while 
the others ran away (Refik 1932, 57). Yitilmiş Abdal was accused of being Kızılbaş by 
the kadı of Elbistan in 1577 (Refik 1932, 63). In a similar way, according to the record of 
the kadı sicil of Üsküdar from 1514, Ali b. Koçu, Mustafa b. Bahadır, and Mehmed b. Ali 
were witnesses of Şah Bali and swore in the sharia court that Şah Bali b. Ali Fakih was 
not a Kızılbaş (Yılmaz 2008, 120). This indicates that Şah Bali was accused of being 
Kızılbaş. In 1578 in the Kürtün district people who were known as Kızılbaş, râfizî, and 
mülhid were sentenced to exile in Cyprus (Savaş, 2013, 196). 
 
In these orders it seems that people were accused, investigated, and punished solely for 
the offence of becoming Kızılbaş or being Kızılbaş/râfizî and not for any other offence, 
since there is not any clear statement regarding other offences. The existence of the 
Sürhser notebook as well as the orders from the Porte to investigate and capture the 
Kızılbaş are indications of the profiling, surveillance, and investigation of these groups 
(Imber 1976, 247-248).  
 
The following orders are about the investigation of people who were accused of being 
Kızılbaş, and of being malignant. In Merzifon during the enforcement of an investigation 
order regarding the “melâhide” who were known as Kızılbaş, suspicious individuals 
named Vehhab Dede and Mehmet were accused of being Kızıllbaş and of various kinds 
of malignancy in 1571 (Yıldırım et al. 1996, 408). According to a similar order from 1570, 
the Bey of Aydın stated that he caught nine persons who were known for their rafz and 
ilhâd as well as for their malignancy (Şener and Hezarfen, 2002, 45). In these cases, 
general orders were given regarding the investigation and punishment of the people who 
were known Kızılbaş.  
 
While there are general statements of malignancy in the above orders, as the following 
cases show misleading Muslims, having another religious opinion and not following the 
69 
 
 
 
ehl-i sunnah path, crimes accompanied the quality of being known or reported as Kızılbaş 
and/or râfizî. In addition to these, being in betrayal against the ehl-i sunnah as well as 
interacting with the Safavid side and committing various petty offences also accompanied 
the quality of being known or reported as Kızılbaş and/or râfizî. In Çorum Ahmet, Turak, 
Turhan, Dede(?), Aydın (?), Habil (?) and Ademcan (?) were accused of being Kızılbaş 
and not ehl-i sunnah in 1585. They were also accused of committing treason against 
Muslims and the four caliphs. They were accused of acting malignantly as well (2018, 
211-212). In the same manner, in 1577 a person named Kör Tatar from the community of 
Dokuz in the Kosan district of Adana was accused of being râfizî. He was also accused 
of serving in the revâfiz community, deviating people from their madhab, gathering 
people around himself, and doing malignancy all the time (Şener and Hezarfen 2002, 97). 
In these orders accusations of not being ehl-i sunnah, committing treason against Muslim, 
and deviating people from their madhab accompanied the accusations of being Kızılbaş 
and râfizî.  
 
Other than the offences that were seen as contrary to Sunni Islam, there are cases in which 
the offences which were seen as a threat to state security accompanied an accusation of 
being reported as Kızılbaş/râfizî. In 1578, the Porte required the capture of people who 
were known as Kızılbaş and râfizî and who sent alms and money to Yukarı Cânib (Şener 
and Hezarfen 2002, 111). In a different order, Abdurrahman, the kadı naib of Sivas and 
Mustafa, the kadı of Divriği accused Çini Mehmet from Divriği of being Kızılbaş and 
interacting with Yukarı Cânib (Savaş 2018, 208). In another order dated 1577, a spy of 
the Porte accused the inhabitants of Kangallı, Alipınarı close to Sivas, and people who 
lived in the vicinity of these places as well as the vast majority of people in Amasya, 
Çorum, Hüseyinabad, the plateau of Merzifon and people in the vicinity of these places 
of being famous for rafz and ilhâd. They were also accused of having the inclination and 
sympathy towards Yukarı Cânib and of interacting with Yukarı Cânib and sending nuzur 
and alms there (Kahveci 1998, 256-257).  
 
It can be stated that collecting and sending nezir and alms to Yukarı Cânib and interacting 
with or having an inclination to Yukarı Cânib were the most common offences regarding 
state security that accompanied the accusation of being Kızılbaş. There are also cases in 
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which petty offences and turpitudes accompanied the accusation of being Kızılbaş, as 
happened in the case of hatib Etmekçi oğlu Mehmet who was accused of being known 
and famous for rafz and ilhâd, as well as being zındîk and mülhid in 1568. Besides these, 
he was accused of treason against the ulema and suleha, as well as speaking badly of the 
Quran, lying, robberty, and doing malignancy constantly (Yıldırım et al. 1999,119-120).  
 
As these cases demonstrate to be demarked as Kızılbaş itself was enough to be accused 
and persecuted, especially when in addition to other offences. In these cases, people were 
accused of being known as Kızılbaş, râfizî, mülhid, or ehl-i fesâd and punished based on 
these accusations. While the accusation of being known as a Kızılbaş was present in all 
kinds of accusations, here in most of these cases it gives the impression that the people 
were accused first and foremost with the offence of being Kızılbaş or being known for it, 
and later of various offences that range from insulting the prophet to having an inclination 
towards Yukarı Cânib. For the Ottoman state the quality of being Kızılbaş carried the 
possibility of the commitment of many kinds of offences that were seen as politically 
subversive acts to the state authority and against the accepted Islamic understanding and 
moral code in society. Hence, what the Kızılbaş meant in the political and religious 
understanding of the Ottoman state might have led to the consideration of being Kızılbaş 
as a crime own of its own without the addition of another offence. 
 
It is possible to say that accusations that threatened state security were more directly 
“political” compared to other offences that were more “religious” or “cultural” such as 
not knowing how to pray and fast, and performing the mum söndürme rite. However, it is 
not possible to classify the offences strictly and definitively as political or religious for 
several reasons. First, it seems that the Ottoman state did not differentiat the offences in 
in terms of their quality or supposed quality as political, religious, or as something else. 
It treated them in the same way, as simply an offence. This possible attribution of a quality 
is our own doing and it might not be a valid in the conditions and understanding of the 
sixteenth century Ottoman Empire. Another issue that needs to be considered is the 
identification of the suspects and content of the orders.  
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The word Kızılbaş meant both political subversion and unwanted religious understanding 
and practice for the Ottoman state. Every accusation in our examples contains either 
implicit or explicit identification and accusation of being Kızılbaş for the suspects, in 
addition to other offences. In these orders it is not certain by which characteristics the 
term Kızılbaş was used as an accusation and identification. Lastly, the religio-legal 
ground on which the accusation, investigation, and punishment were applied was defined 
both politically and religiously. Therefore, it can be said that the accusation carried both 
religious and political qualities within themselves and people were accused of both 
political and religious offences at the same time even if it was not stated explicitly. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This thesis has made a categorization of accusations made against Kızılbaş individuals 
and groups by the Ottoman state based on the topic, content, and similarities of the 
offences. To propose a categorization and analysis, first, in Chapter 2, I explained the 
legal religio-political terms that were used by three prominent şeyhülislâms of the 
sixteenth century to define Kızılbaş individuals and groups. I also examined the 
şeyhülislâms’ prescriptions for the practical measures against the Kızılbaş on legal and 
political grounds in the same chapter. 
 
The three prominent Ottoman şeyhülislâms of the sixteenth century defined the Kızılbaş 
analogously by using the same terms and attributing to them similar offences. Although 
the şeyhülislâms employed similar terms to identify these groups, they opted for different 
approaches regarding the practical measurements that should be taken against them. Their 
approaches can be divided into two based on whether Kızılbaş individuals and groups 
were subjects of the Ottoman Empire or not. Ottoman administrative authority applied 
various countermeasures throughout the sixteenth century. According to the mühimme 
registers these applications do not necessarily coincide with the definition or approach of 
the period’s şeyhülislâm. According to the orders it can be said that the Ottoman Empire 
applied a synthesis of the approaches of Sarıgörez Hamza and Ebusuud in the accusation 
and punishment of these communities: It accused all Kızılbaş individuals and groups and 
Safavid supporters regardless of whether they were subjects or non-subjects, but 
according to the situation and conditions the state showed leniency towards them, 
especially in punishment by giving less severe punishments. 
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In Chapter 3, in order to put the accusations into their wider framework, I explained the 
criminal law procedure and process in the Ottoman Empire. It is not easy to categorize 
offences and punishments in Islamic law as categories overlap and this has consequently 
put strain on the selection and application of the grouping in this study. As for application, 
Islamic law leaves a legal and legitimate elbowroom for the ruler to define and determine 
certain laws to protect and preserve public security, order, and morality. In relation to this 
work’s topic this elbowroom is significant because by means of this right, Ottoman rulers 
were able to inject their own administrative laws legitimately into criminal law regarding 
the topics that were left undetailed by the sharia. The Ottoman criminal code had certain 
regulations regarding the criminal procedure but regarding the accusations and penalties 
it had very little definitive explanations. It had mostly implications or references for 
punishments. This becomes a challenge in examining the Ottoman documentation of 
practical cases and Kızılbaş prosecution regarding the procedure, offences, and 
punishments because the Ottoman criminal code did not have definitive, concrete, 
standardized patterns and regulations that could be followed in practice, i.e. through 
official decrees.  
 
In Chapter 2, while legal religio-political terms and identifications provided a theoretical 
framework for the accusations and punishments of the Kızılbaş, in Chapter 3 an 
examination of Ottoman criminal law and judicial procedure pointed to the practical 
framework, procedure, method, and means in which legal religio-political terms and 
identifications were put into work. It was in this mechanism that the Kızılbaş were 
accused and punished.  
 
In Chapter 4, I evaluated accusations that were made against Kızılbaş individuals and 
groups using numerous varied official records, and giving many examples for different 
accusations. I categorized the accusations that were made against the Kızılbaş into five 
main categories based on their type, content, and similarities. The accusation against the 
Kızılbaş can be categorized as: 1) acts and deeds seen as contrary to Sunni Islam and the 
ehl-i sunnah, 2) tradition and practices seen as contrary to state-prescribed Islam in 
relation to public morality, 3) conduct seen as a threat to state security, 4) Common 
offences committed by the Kızılbaş 5) being Kızılbaş or Râfizî as a punishable quality.  
74 
 
 
 
 
At the end of this categorization it is possible to reach the following conclusions regarding 
the accusations that were made against the Kızılbaş. In many cases, the offender’s identity 
as Kızılbaş or having rafz and ilhâd is stated directly, in addition to their offences in either 
the accusation or in the verification part. In others, the committed offence indicates rafz, 
ilhâd and Kızılbaş status itself. As certain offences were mainly associated with the 
Kızılbaş communities at that time, it can be deduced that the authorities considered these 
people to be Kızılbaş and ehl-i fesâd in general without stating as such. 
 
While these accusations can be categorized into five, we cannot say that these categories 
are established, definitive, and distinctive. According to the orders people can be accused 
of one or more than one offence at the same time. This can be either from one category 
or from different categories. Therefore, while certain offences can be put into one 
category based on their topic, content, and similarity, the overlapping of two or more 
categories is possible and this is seen in many orders.  
 
There are orders in which the actions that were seen as contrary to the Sunni 
understanding of Islam overlapped with the traditions and practices of certain groups that 
were seen as contrary to state-prescribed Islam in relation to public morality. This overlap 
is valid for other categories as well. Offences that were seen as contrary to Sunni Islam 
and/or tradition and practices that were not in compliance with state-prescribed Islam and 
morality can also be found together with offences that threatened the state and public 
security. This makes it very hard to put them into solid, definitive categories because it is 
possible to make new categories out of these five categories by combining them in various 
ways.  
 
Another conclusion that I have reached is that because all these offences and categories 
are intertwined with each other in the orders, it is not possible to classify them as 
“religious” and “political” offences in a clear cut way by attributing “political” or 
“religious” qualities to them, although some accusations contain predominantly religious 
meanings and characteristics and others contain political ones. In the orders the 
accusations are considered only as an accusation without implicitly and explicitly 
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demarcating them as religious or political, and are treated in the same way without making 
any kind of differentiation based on the characteristic, type, and connotation. Because of 
this, and because the terms Kızılbaş and râfizî have both a religious and political meaning 
and were employed both by the Ottoman şeyhülislâms and the political authority in 
religio-legal and political context, accusations cannot be separated strictly as “religious” 
or “political.” Therefore, when Kızılbaş groups and individuals were accused of 
“religious” offences simultaneously they also were accused of “political” ones and vice 
versa because the legal and socially accepted ground were provided by the religio-legal 
terms of the şeyhülislâms. This dual quality can be detected especially in the orders in 
which individuals or groups were accused of “religious” and “political” offences at the 
same time, or where the accusation had both “religious” and “political” significance such 
as being a disciple of Iran or being rebellious against the state.  
 
In this work I used only a selected number of printed and transcribed mühimme and a few 
sicil records. I have not included other sources and other dimensions that are connected 
to the accusations or affected them in certain regards. In this respect both the accusations 
of Kızılbaş and Kızılbaş prosecution can further be studied from other aspects and in a 
more detailed way. The variety, number, and categorizations might be widened by using 
more mühimme and sicil records and other sources such as ahkam records. 
 
Furthermore, the available evidence and the framework of this work does not suggest the 
severity and the importance of the offences if there was something as such and there is 
no indication about on which criteria different punishments were given to the same or 
very similar offences. I did not examine this issue and the punishments given as a direct 
result of the accusations in a detailed way. An investigation into these issues might be a 
further contribution for a better understanding of the accusations. In a broader study that 
includes these points a more complete and a more delineated picture of Kızılbaş 
prosecution can be offered. 
  
76 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
Printed Primary Sources 
 
Ahmet Refik. 1932. Onaltıncı Asırda Rafiizlik ve Bektâşîlik. İstanbul: La kitap. 
 
Anonim Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman edited by. F.Giese. 1992.Nihat Azamat (ed). İstanbul: 
Marmara Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Basım Evi. 
 
Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512). 2000. Necdet Öztürk (ed). İstanbul: Türk Dünyasi 
Araştırmaları Vakfı. 
 
Aşıkpaşazade. 1949. Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman. Nihat Atsız (ed). İstanbul: Türkiye Basım 
Evi. 
Bitlisi. 1995. Selim-nâme. Ahmet Uğur, Mustafa Çuhadar and Ahmet Gül (eds.). İstanbul: 
Isis. 
 
Celalzade Mustafa. 1990. Selim-nâme. Ahmet Uğur and Mustafa Çuhadar (eds). Ankara: 
Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları. 
 
Ebu’l Hayr-ı Rumi. 2007. Saltıknâme (Saltık Gaazi Destanı Haza Gaza-yı Sarı Saltık). 
Necati Demir and Dursun Erdem (eds). İstanbul: Destan Yayınları. 
 
Hadidi. 1991. Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman (1299-1523). Necdet Öztürk (eds). İstanbul: Marmara 
Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
 
Hezarfen, Ahmet and Cemal Şener. 2002. Osmanlı Arşivinde Mühimme ve İrade 
Defterlerinde Alevîler-Bektâşîler. İstanbul: Karacaahmet Sultan Derneği Yayınları. 
 
 
77 
 
 
 
Kahveci, Gülay. 1998. “29 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (984-1576): Tahlil-Özet-
Transkripsiyon.” MA thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi. 
 
Lütfi Paşa. 2001. Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman. Kayhan Atik (ed). Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı 
Yayınları. 
 
Sahillioğlu, Halil (ed). 2002. Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi h.951-952 Tarihli ve E-12321 
Numaralı Mühimme Defteri. 2002.İstanbul: IRCICA. 
 
Ünal, Mehmet Ali (ed.). 1995. Mühimme defteri 44. İzmir: Akademi Yayınları. 
 
Yıldırım, Hacı Osman, Vahdettin Atik, Murat Cebecioğlu, Muhammed Safi, Mustafa 
Serin, Osman Uslu, and Numan Yekeler (eds.). 1995. 6 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri 
(972/1564–1565): Özet-Transkripsiyon ve İndeks I. 1995. Ankara: T.C. 
Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arsivi Daire Başkanlığı 
Yayın Nu: 28, Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi: III.  
 
Yıldırım, Hacı Osman, Vahdettin Atik, Murat Cebecioğlu, Muhammed Safi, Mustafa 
Serin, Osman Uslu, and Numan Yekeler (eds.). 1996. 12 Nolu Mühimme Defteri 
(978-979/d1570–1572): Özet-Transkripsiyon ve İndeks I. 1996. Ankara: T.C. 
Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arsivi Daire Baskanlığı 
Yayın Nu: 33, Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi: IV. 
 
Yıldırım, Hacı Osman, Vahdettin Atik, Murat Cebecioğlu, Hasan Çağlar, Mustafa Serin, 
Osman Uslu, and Numan Yekeler, (eds.). 1999. 7 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (975-
976/1567–1569): Özet-Transkripsiyon-İndeks, I-II-III. Ankara: T.C.Başbakanlık 
Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı Yayın Nu: 37 
Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi: V.  
 
Yılmaz, Coşkun (ed.). 2008. İstanbul Kadı Sicilleri Üsküdar Mahkemesi 1. Numaralı Sicil 
(H. 919-927 / 1513 – 1521). İstanbul: İSAM yayınları Kadı Sicilleri Dizisi 1. 
 
78 
 
 
 
 
 
Secondary Sources  
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